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This study examined the relation of psychological mindedness (PM) to treatment outcome and 
explored whether PM might be enhanced by participation in cognitive-behavioral therapy, an 
approach that teaches skills reflective of those involved in PM.  Psychological mindedness is 
assumed to be an attribute that contributes to a patient’s ability to engage in and benefit from 
insight oriented psychotherapy; there has been limited attention in regard to its potential impact 
on other therapeutic approaches. 
This study evaluated PM within the context of a clinical trial of three different 
psychotherapeutic interventions for adolescent depression including cognitive-behavioral therapy 
(CBT), systemic-behavior family therapy (SBFT), and non-directive supportive therapy (NST).  
A total of 101 adolescents completed a modified version of the Psychological Mindedness Scale 
at pre-and post- treatment.  It was predicted that higher PM baseline scores would result in 
improved outcome as assessed by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Children’s 
Global Assessment Scale (CGAS).  Higher PM scores were not predictive of improvement of 
depression or psychosocial functioning across the whole sample.  However, there was an 
interaction within the high verses low PM group such that the manner in which depression 
responded differed across treatment groups over time.  CBT had more rapid improvement 
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compared to SBFT, but not NST resulting in a lower BDI at the end of treatment.  A secondary 
analysis, predicting that CBT would show a greater increase in PM over SBFT and NST was not 
confirmed.   Patients in CBT did not show a greater increase in PM over SBFT and NST.  
However, there was a significant increase in patient’s PM across all three treatments.  
The relation between baseline demographic and clinical measures and PM were also 
investigated.  Higher PM was associated with increased age and older age of onset of depression. 
Clinical variables such as increased hopelessness and increased depression were associated with 
a lower PM score.   Clinical implications of these findings were discussed, current limitations to 
the study of PM were reviewed, and suggestions for future research presented. 
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 1.0  CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Identifying variables that predict which types of patients are most likely to benefit from 
psychotherapy has been the focus of numerous reviews (Bergin & Garfield, 1994; Luborsky, 
Christoph, Mintz, & Auerbach, 1988).  Variables such as amount of motivation for treatment, 
positive attitudes toward self and therapist, and level of intelligence have been associated with 
differential outcome.  One pretreatment variable that does not appear to have been systematically 
studied is the construct of psychological mindedness (PM), and this is especially true in 
adolescent psychotherapy research. 
 The primary aim of this study was to empirically examine the relation of PM to treatment 
outcome within an adolescent population.  Conceptual definitions of PM have included variant, 
but related descriptions.  Some definitions relate solely to the self, “a person’s ability to see 
relationships among thoughts, feelings, and actions with the goal of learning the meanings and 
causes of his experiences and behaviors” (Applebaum, 1973, p. 36).  Conte (1996) extended the 
concept beyond self-focus, as involving “. . . both self-understanding and an interest in the 
motivation and behavior of others” (p.251).  Finally, Hall’s (1992) definition introduces the 
multidimensional nature of PM.  She defined it as “reflectivity about psychological processes, 
relationships and meanings [that] is displayed by  . . . both interest in and ability for such 
reflectivity across affective and intellectual dimensions” (pp. 139-140).  Collectively, these 
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 definitions suggest that PM is related to ability, personality, motivation, and interest.  For the 
purpose of this study, PM was viewed as the interest in and motivation to achieve psychological 
understanding of the self.  A person was considered to be psychologically minded if she or he 
was able to access feelings, was open to new ideas, was willing to try and understand oneself and 
others, and had an interest in the meaning and motivation of his or her own and other’s behavior. 
 Patients who are high in psychological mindedness would appear to be introspective and, 
one might speculate, more likely to benefit from the process of psychotherapy.  Interest in this 
concept grew out of the author’s experience of conducting psychotherapy with adolescents in an 
outpatient clinic focusing on depression, suicidal ideation, and suicidal behavior.  Certain 
adolescents appeared to be qualitatively different from others.  For example, they seemed to be 
more introspective, had a desire for self-understanding, and overall engaged more in the 
treatment process.  On an anecdotal basis, these adolescents seemed to fare better in treatment 
than their counterparts.  The aim of this study was to explore the differences between the two 
groups.  In the less introspective group, the therapist might focus on the consequences of self-
destructive behavior, emphasize skill development, or more quickly suggest consideration of a 
medication trial to help ameliorate an unpleasant affective state rather than attempting to work 
the problem through using talk therapy.  The study’s intent was to explore on an empirical basis 
the relation of PM to treatment outcome in an effort to aid therapists in determining who is most 
likely to benefit from psychotherapy as well as provide direction on the approach to treatment. 
1.1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Researchers have focused on the construct of PM as it relates to treatment outcome in 
adult patients.  In 1990, Conte, Plutchik, Jung, Picard, Karusa, and Lotterman investigated the 
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 relation of PM to outcome in a group of adult, affectively disordered outpatients.  Participants’ 
pretherapy PM scores were found to significantly correlate with the number of psychotherapy 
sessions attended, increase in global functioning, and decrease in psychosocial symptoms.  The 
results supported the positive relation between PM and outcome, but were limited by the small 
sample size (N = 44) and exclusive focus on adults.  Piper, Joyce, Rosie, and Azim (1994) found 
similar results in a study focused on psychiatric outpatients (N = 109) that included a small 
cohort of adolescents.  Results of the study indicated that PM played an important role in 
predicting favorable treatment outcome.  Two additional studies attempted to duplicate the 
positive relation between PM and treatment outcome.  McCallum and Piper (1990) found that 
PM was predictive of psychiatric outpatients remaining in short-term group therapy but failed to 
find significant direct relation between PM and outcomes.  Conte et al. (1996) attempted to 
replicate their previous 1990 study using a larger sample size of 116 outpatients.  The authors 
found a high level of PM at intake was significantly related to number of sessions attended; 
however, the prediction of a relation between high PM and treatment outcome was not 
duplicated. 
 Most attention to PM has focused on clarifying the conceptual meaning of the term, with 
less attention devoted to the issue of measurement.  To date only a limited number of studies 
have examined the relation between PM and outcome and these were inconclusive in regard to 
their findings.  Therefore, a primary aim of this study was to examine the relation of PM to 
outcome in the adolescent population. 
A related area of interest, beyond measurement of PM to outcome, was the issue of 
stability of psychological mindedness within an individual.  A review of the literature on PM 
conveys the impression that a patient’s PM is relatively stable and therefore difficult to change.  
  3
 Consider the terminology used by researchers in defining the concept.  Wolitzky and Reuben 
(1974) defined PM as “a tendency to understand and explain behavior in psychological terms,” 
(p. 26).  In an article focusing on psychological mindedness in psychotherapists, Farber (1985) 
stated that PM “may be considered a trait which has at its core the disposition to reflect upon the 
meaning and motivation of behavior, thoughts, and feelings in oneself and others” (p. 170).  
Further emphasizing PM as an innate trait, he continued, “psychological mindedness is a gift, a 
way of being and understanding” (p. 176).  Appelbaum (1973) who questioned whether an 
individual can be trained to become psychologically minded expressed the most definitive view.  
He answered, “probably not, to the extent that it is dependent upon constitutional or other early 
developmental structures, just as high musical proficiency cannot be taught to those without 
basic musical abilities” (p. 44).  The implication was that PM was basically an attribute that 
some people possess while others do not. 
This view was consistent with the emphasis on the pretherapy assessment of PM.  Here, 
PM primarily served as a prognostic indicator for identifying which patients were suitable for 
dynamically oriented psychotherapies (Coltart, 1988; McCallum & Piper, 1997; Sifneos, 1968).  
As noted, most research on this construct has been conducted with the adult population.  
Therefore it was possible that adults (having had more years to progress in their cognitive and 
emotional development) reached a ceiling in their level of PM.  Adolescents are at a different 
point of development in the midst of continuing maturation of their cognitive and emotional 
skills.  The potential for growth in their level of PM may be greater than that of adults and may 
be enhanced by participation in a therapy process.  Because therapy invites self-reflection, the 
adolescent engages in a process of exercising cognitive and emotional skills involved in the 
development of PM.  This could include evaluating perceptions of self or others, of events, 
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 and/or sifting through mixed emotions.  Moreover, certain aspects of PM may be influenced in a 
positive direction such as openness to change and interest in the meaning and motivation of 
behavior.  Since practice and experience are important variables in the development of any skill, 
this study also investigated the development of PM in the context of the adolescents’ 
participation in therapy.  In the study several questions related to PM were explored.  Does the 
experience of therapy influence the development of PM?  Are there differential effects dependent 
on the type of therapy that is involved?  For example, will adolescents involved in a therapy that 
teaches skills of self-reflection be more likely to demonstrate accretions in PM? 
Data for this study were derived from a clinical trial of three different psychotherapeutic 
interventions for adolescent depression (Brent, Holder, Kolko, Birmaher, Baugher, Roth, Iyengar 
& Johnson, 1997).  Funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, the clinical trial occurred 
over a five-year period beginning in 1991.  In the clinical trial, 107 adolescent patients with 
DSM-III-R major depressive disorder were randomly assigned to one of three treatments.  The 
clinical trial compared cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), systemic-behavior therapy (SBFT), 
and non-directive supportive therapy (NST).  It was predicted that patients treated with CBT and 
SBFT, relative to patients treated with NST, would show greater improvement in the prevalence 
and severity of depression and suicidality.  The main finding was that CBT resulted in more 
rapid and complete symptomatic relief of depression than either SBFT or NST.  As the largest 
and most extensive clinical trial ever conducted assessing psychotherapeutic interventions with 
this population, the study’s finding represented a major contribution to the field. 
As part of the clinical trial, participants completed a bound booklet of nine measures 
assessing a variety of areas.  For a complete description see Brent et al., 1997.  The measure of 
interest to this study was a measure of psychological mindedness that was completed at 
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 assessment and the final 12th session.   A description of the Psychological Mindedness Scale 
(Conte, Ratto, & Karusu, 1996) utilized in this study is provided in Chapter Three.  This 
measurement of PM provided the basis for the primary aim of this study, to examine the relation 
of PM to outcome, and a secondary aim, to explore if the experience of therapy influences the 
development of PM.  Specifically, it was proposed that cognitive behavioral therapy would 
enhance the development of PM as compared to the other two treatment approaches.  Cognitive-
behavioral treatment requires patients to comprehend the interaction between thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors.  This task closely mirrored some definitions of PM (e.g., Applebaum, 1973; Hall, 
1992), and presupposed an ability and motivation for self-reflection, which is central to PM.  It 
was proposed that exercising these cognitive processes would positively impact the development 
of PM.  A complete discussion of the treatment approaches occurs in Chapter Three. 
1.1.2 Significance of the Study 
In summary, understanding the relation of PM to outcome could extend knowledge about 
what types of patients are most likely to benefit from psychotherapy.  More attention has been 
afforded to the conceptual underpinnings of PM with less emphasis on how PM potentially has 
an impact on patient improvement.  Most work on PM has focused on the adult population, as 
compared to the adolescent population, although there is paucity of research in both groups in 
regard to the relation of PM to outcome.  A subset of studies suggested that patients high in PM 
show greater improvement on various outcome measures, although results pertaining to outcome 
studies are mixed.  This study extended these findings by exploring the relation of PM to 
outcome in a group of adolescents who participated in a clinical treatment trial for depression. 
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 It was unclear whether or how psychological mindedness itself might respond to 
treatment.  Certainly some forms of treatment that focus on skills involved in PM might result in 
a different response by the patient.  This study explored whether different treatments or 
participation in the process of therapy in and of itself results in accretions of PM.  The following 
hypotheses were explored. 
1.1.3 Hypotheses 
1. Adolescents rated higher in psychological mindedness as compared to adolescents rated 
lower in psychological mindedness will experience greater improvement in severity of 
depression following psychotherapy as measured on the self-rated Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, 1987) and level of social and psychiatric functioning as assessed on the 
interview rated Children’s Global Assessment Scale (Shaffer, Gould, Brasic Ambrosini, 
Fisher, Bird & Aluwahlia, 1982).  
2. Patients treated with cognitive behavioral therapy will show a greater increase in PM 
compared to systemic behavioral family therapy and nondirective supportive therapy. 
1.1.4 Definition of Terms 
Psychological mindedness is the interest in and motivation to achieve psychological 
understanding of the self.  Psychological mindedness was operationalized as the ability to access 
feelings, openness to new ideas, a willingness to try and understand self and others, and interest 
in the meaning and motivation of behavior (Conte et al., 1996). 
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 Depression was defined as low mood and negative feelings about self and future (Beck, 
1987). 
Level of functioning was defined as impairment in social and psychiatric functioning.  
Functioning was assessed in terms of adolescent behavior at home, school, and with peers 
(Shaffer, Gould et al., 1982).   
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 2.0  CHAPTER 
2.1 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Although the concept of psychological mindedness has a long history in psychology, it does not 
appear in the literature as an identified term until the last half of the 21st century.  Most clinicians 
intuitively understand its meaning and value to the psychotherapy process, yet empirical 
attention has been relatively scant.  PM represents an abstract process, not directly observable, 
and therefore complex in terms of definition.  It has been heavily influenced by the theoretical 
orientation of those who have grappled with its meaning.  The following section reviews 
definitions of psychological mindedness.  Subsequent sections describe attempts to measure PM 
and review empirical research on the relation between PM and outcome and between PM and 
personal characteristics.  The chapter concludes with a description of the evolutions of 
psychological mindedness in children and adolescents. 
2.1.1 Definitions of Psychological Mindedness 
 According to Farber (1985) the history of PM dates back to Murray’s (1938) concept of 
“intraception” (a disposition toward emphasizing the psychological aspects of persons or events) 
and before that to Jung’s (1922) concept of “introversion” and William James’ (1907) concept of 
“tenderminded.”  Despite this lineage, PM remains an elusive concept to define.  Words 
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 including insightfulness, reflectiveness, self-appraisal, self-awareness, and introspection have 
been used synonymously with PM (Applebaum, 1973).  Operational definitions reviewed below 
vary considerably, despite some overlapping similarities. 
 Tolar and Rezinikoff (1960) define PM as an ability to comprehend the causative factors 
that underlie or determine behaviors and general attitudes.  Tolor and Reznikoff elaborate that 
this type of insight encompasses an ability to comprehend the psychoanalytic concept of defense 
mechanisms and unconscious conflicts in everyday scenarios. 
 Reiser (1971) defines PM as consisting of three elements:  (a) sensitivity to symbolic 
meaning and similarities between life events in historical context; (b) empathy for others and 
intuition about their affective states; and (c) curiosity about human behavior and motivations.  In 
a subsequent article, Lower and colleagues (1972) define PM as “a capacity for insight, 
introspection, intuition, remembering dreams and fantasies, awareness of transference, of internal 
conflict; sensitivity to own feelings and curiosity about drives” (p. 615). 
 Appelbaum (1973) defines PM as “a person’s ability to see relationships among thoughts, 
feelings, and actions, with the goal of learning the meanings and causes of experiences and 
behavior” (p.36).  This definition closely mirrors Farber’s (1985) description of PM as the 
disposition to reflect upon the meaning and motivations of one’s own and other’s behavior.  The 
four dimensions thought to underlie this capability, according to Appelbaum, include: (a) 
cognitive abilities and intuitive talents; (b) a curiosity and genuine interest in human beings such 
that an individual is intrigued by the way that the mind works, is capable of concern for the self 
and is similarly able “to allow affects their rightful place” (p.37); (c) for purposes of treatment, a 
self-directedness that characterizes a person’s psychological thinking; and (d) a present and 
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 prospective ability on the part of the individual “to put his capacities for psychological thinking 
at the service of the psychoanalytic process” (p.37). 
 Other clinicians as well as researchers who have grappled with the meaning of 
psychological mindedness have embraced formulations less comprehensive in scope than 
Appelbaum’s.  Ryan and Cicchetti (1985) in examining pre-therapy variables that might predict 
the formation of a therapeutic alliance in psychotherapy, note that PM “refers to the quality of 
patient’s psychological set toward himself/herself and his/her difficulties” (p. 720).  In 
operational terms, patients who regard the source of their disturbance as external to the self are 
judged to be at a low point in terms of psychological mindedness in contrast to those at a high 
point who describe their experience of problems as intraspsychic or arising from within the self.  
Similarly, Rogawski (1982) defines PM as the ability to verbalize internal experiences as the 
product of one’s own mind and feelings and not caused by another. 
Levinson, Sharaf, and Gilbert (1966) view psychological mindedness as a disposition that 
is comprised of an intellectual and emotional component.  The former aspect pertains to a 
cognitive understanding of psychological issues while the latter refers to the individual’s 
capacity to experience his/her inner life, as well as the ability to be attuned to and share another’s 
feelings.  This is similar to Hall (1992), who defined accurate psychological mindedness as 
“reflectivity about psychological processes, relationships, and meanings [that] is displayed by 
…both interest and ability for such reflectivity across affective and intellectual dimensions” (pp. 
139-140). According to Hall, ability is contributed to and limited by interest and intellectual 
psychological mindedness is contributed to and limited by affective psychological mindedness.  
Hall constructed what she refers to as a “ceiling” model in which two distinct dimensions 
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 (interest/ability and intellect/affect) are to be understood “not in a strictly causal manner but in a 
contributive and limiting manner” (p. 135).  Hall describes the relationship in practical terms,  
just as people cannot display accurate psychological mindedness if they have no 
interest in doing so, they will come up similarly empty if they have the interest 
but lack the ability (p. 136).   
 
Werman (1979) states that PM is related to one’s conception of the external world, as 
well as one’s introspective abilities.  According to Werman, individuals with good PM are better 
able to tolerate ambiguity and to believe in the random nature of events. 
 Wolitzky and Reuben (1974) in their work on the role of psychological mindedness in the 
psychotherapeutic process, argued that PM is best understood as  
. . . a tendency to understand or explain behavior in psychological terms, that is, to 
view behavior as expressing and communicating information about the needs, 
wishes, purposes, intentions, conflicts, defensive strategies, etc., of the person in 
question, oneself or another.   
 
They note that interest and ability “may have different correlates and different implications for 
progress in psychotherapy when the focus of understanding is the self” (p.26).  Dollinger, 
Reader, Marnett, and Tylenda (1983) explain PM as “reading between the lines of behavior . . . 
in other words, looking beyond the surface of overt behavior for underlying psychological 
meaning or consistency” (pp. 183-184).   
 Coltart (1988) explains how an insight-oriented therapist should assess PM in the 
diagnostic interview.  According to Coltart, the following elements comprise PM: 
1) The capacity to give a psychological history [which deepens as it 
progresses]… 
 
2) The capacity to give a history without needing too much prompting, and a 
history which gives the listener an increasing awareness that the patient 
feels currently, related to himself, to his own story… 
 
3) The capacity to bring up memories with appropriate affect… 
 
  12
 4) Some awareness in the patient that he has an unconscious mental life… 
 
5) Some capacity to step back…from self experience, and observe it 
reflectively… 
 
6) A capacity, or more strongly a wish, to accept and handle increased 
responsibility for the self… 
 
7) Imagination… 
 
8) Some capacity for achievement and some realistic self-esteem… 
 
9) Overall impression [about the assessor’s experience of a thorough, intense, 
working consultation with a psychologically minded person] (pp.819-
820). 
 
McCallum and Piper (1997) describe PM psychoanalytically as a person’s ability to 
identify dynamic (intra-psychic) conflicts, for example, wishes, anxiety, and defenses and relate 
them to a person’s difficulties.  This definition is similar to Wolitzky and Reuben’s (1974) 
description of PM as the ability to view behavior in psychological terms by seeing actions as 
expressing underlying needs, wishes, defenses, etc.  In a similar vein, Baekeland and Lundwall’s 
(1975) definition relates to a person’s suitability for treatment.  According to these researchers, 
PM  
. . . implies the patient’s ability to recognize and admit psychological and 
interpersonal problems, to see himself in psychological terms, to use or to accept 
the use of psychological constructs, or to at least imagine psychological causes of 
his symptoms and behaviors (p. 756). 
 
The definitions of PM provided thus far have all been offered by psychodynamic 
theorists within the psychoanalytic therapeutic arena.  Historically, interest in PM grew out of 
attempts to identify patients best suited for analytically oriented therapies.  Thus, much of the 
work in attempting to define the construct of PM revolved around analytic concepts.  
Recently, Grant (2001) broadened the definition of PM to be more inclusive of cognitive-
behavioral processes. According to Grant, PM is best conceptualized as a form of meta-
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 cognition, “a predisposition to engage in acts of affective and intellectual inquiry into how and 
why oneself and/or others behave, think, and feel the way that they do” (p.12).  Grant’s model 
proposes PM be assessed by measuring individuals’ metacognitive processes of self-reflection 
and insight.  In a re-conceptualization of Hall’s (1992) “ceiling” model, Grant maintains the 
major premise that PM involves affective and intellectual interest in being psychologically 
minded, and affective and intellectual abilities and skills to be psychologically minded.  
However, he differs in view on Hall’s notion that the relation between ‘interest’ and ‘ability’ is 
unidirectional with one both contributing to and limiting the other.  In his view this is an 
oversimplification “because one’s ability to perform a task mediates one’s interest in performing 
that task, and one’s interests stimulate one’s abilities – a multidirectional relationship” (p. 14).  
In his model the predisposition for affective and intellectual interest leads to reflective inquiry 
(through therapy or informal inquiry) and results in insight.  Grant views insight as the product 
of reflective inquiry and suggests that accretions in insight may ultimately increase an 
individual’s PM.  This would suggest PM may be more malleable to change and not a static 
characteristic as suggested by some writers (Appelbaum, 1973; Farber, 1985; Wolitzky & 
Reuben, 1985).  In discussing practical applications of this model of PM, Grant notes that it has 
special relevance for CBT because self-monitoring and self-evaluation of one’s cognitions, 
emotions, and behaviors is central to successful practice of this treatment.  A review of the 
literature did not connect this new model to any current research.  
Conte, Ratto, and Karusa (1996) also define PM in a more trans-theoretical way, despite 
their psychodynamic orientation. The definition is based on a factor analysis of the PM Scale.  It 
is considered to be trans-theoretical because it does not attempt to operationalize psychoanalytic 
variables.  Conte et al. (1996) provide the following definition:   
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 PM is an attribute of an individual that presupposes a degree of access to one’s 
feelings, a willingness to try to understand oneself and others, a belief in the 
benefit of discussing one’s problems, and interest in the meaning and motivation 
of one’s own and others’ thoughts, feelings, and behavior and capacity for change 
(p. 254).   
 
Conte et al.’s, definition is compatible with previous conceptualizations of PM.  It reflects 
Appelbaum’s (1973) and Grant’s notion of PM as a process of insight that allows an individual 
to see how thoughts, feelings, and actions are interrelated and Farber’s view of it as interest in 
the motivation of one’s own and others’ behavior.  It also reflects Hall’s definition of PM in 
terms of interest in and an ability to develop understanding of psychological processes. 
Recently the construct of psychological mindedness in children and adolescents has 
begun to receive attention.  Hatcher and Hatcher (1997) developed a measure for assessing 
psychological mindedness in this population (reviewed in the following chapter).  They define 
PM as “the capacity to achieve psychological understanding of the self and of others.”  PM 
involves the child’s growing comprehension of the motives, attitudes, and characteristics of the 
self and others.  According to these researchers, PM is built on both cognitive and emotional 
skills, and can be seen as a term characterizing children’s ability to make sense of themselves 
and the world in psychological terms.  In their view, PM is possible because of the child’s and 
adolescent’s increasing ability for abstraction, growing understanding of the self, of mixed 
emotions, and taking the perspective of the others.   
2.1.2 Section Summary 
A review of the various definitions of PM underscores the difficulty of defining this 
complex construct.  It is not surprising that a single definition of the term does not currently exist 
given the diversity of conceptualization described above.  PM is a construct with a long history 
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 of interest represented in the empirical literature since 1960.  Emphasis on the importance of PM 
in the service of psychodynamic therapies has recently broadened to include other theoretical 
orientations.  No matter the orientation, there appears to be a consensus by theorists that those 
who possess this attribute are somehow at an advantage in the therapy process.   
There appears to be certain shared assumptions among the varying definitions of PM.  
First, a psychologically minded person turns attention inward in evaluating subjective experience 
as it relates to outside events.  Such a person utilizes both cognitive and emotional processes.  A 
psychologically minded person reflects upon and attempts to integrate experiences and is able to 
access feelings in pursuit of gaining self- knowledge.  He or she is not limited to an intellectual 
understanding of events.  Finally, there is an openness and receptivity of psychologically minded 
persons to the self-evaluative process.   
An adequate definition of PM also implies that the construct can be assessed with a 
standardized instrument.  The following section reviews the few published instruments that have 
been used to assess PM.  
2.1.3 The Measurement of Psychological Mindedness 
Despite the theoretical attention devoted to the concept of PM and numerous attempts to 
define it, only a few instruments have been developed to measure the construct.  These 
instruments reviewed below, include self-report measures, a videotape and interview process, 
and therapist rated reviews based on projective techniques. 
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 2.1.4 Self- Report Measures 
2.1.4.1 Insight Test 
 According to Connie and Ratto’s (1997) review of self-report measures assessing PM, 
Tolar and Reznikoff (1960) created the Insight Test because the concept occupied a major 
position at the time in theories of psychotherapy, with few empirical investigations of insight.   
Insight was defined as the ability to realistically perceive the environment and the ability to 
comprehend the causative factors determining the attitude and behaviors of others (both of which 
were presumed to underlie an understanding of one's own motivation).  The Insight Test 
measures how well subjects identify defense mechanisms as reflected in their choice of the 
“best” and “worst” explanations of 27 hypothetical situations. The underlying premise is that an 
individual’s PM (used synonymously with insight) can be assessed by determining the degree to 
which an individual accurately interprets the hypothetical situations.  The following example 
represents the defense mechanism reaction formation (correct answer is number three):   
A man who intensely dislikes a fellow worker goes out of his way to speak well of him. 
 
1. The man really doesn’t dislike his coworker. 
 
2. The man believes he will make a better impression on others by speaking well 
of him. 
 
3. The man is overdoing his praises in order to cover up for his real feelings of 
dislike. 
 
4. The man doesn’t want to hurt anyone’s feelings. (Conte & Ratto, 1997, p.3) 
 
 Despite its appeal as the only measure that examines insight into specific defense 
mechanisms, the Insight Test has several shortcomings.  The only reliability data presented by 
Tolar and Reznikoff (1960) was a test-retest coefficient of .86 obtained on a sample of 27 
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 introductory psychology students after a one-week interval.  These authors did not report on any 
measure of internal consistency.  The only measure of internal consistency, reported by 
Abramowitz and Abramowitz (1974) for a modified 12-situation version was a relatively low 
coefficient alpha of .60.  Other issues include difficulty subjects may have in responding to the 
questions due to somewhat confusing directions (McCallum & Piper, 1996) and a reliance on 
psychoanalytically derived defense mechanisms, limiting the research utility of the instrument in 
non-psychoanalytic treatment studies.  The Insight Test has been used occasionally to measure 
the construct (Abramowitz & Abramowitz, 1974; Piper, Azim, McCallum & Joyce, 1990) 
reviewed in a later section on outcome and PM.   
2.1.5 The California Personality Inventory (CPI) 
 The Psychological Mindedness scale (Py) of the CPI is the most renowned and widely 
used measure of the construct (Conte & Ratto, 1997; McCallum & Piper, 1996).  The Py is one 
of 18 subscales of the CPI developed by Gough (1957, 1975) to create a measure of descriptive 
concepts relevant to an individual’s personal and social context.   As described by Conte and 
Ratto (1997), the CPI was an attempt to create a measure of interpersonal behavior different from 
those available at the time, which were primarily used in special settings such as psychiatric 
clinics or for a particular problem such as a vocational choice.  The 22-item Py scale consists of 
six items that are keyed true and 16 keyed false.  Gough (1957) originally defined the 
psychologically minded individual as one who “is interested in, and responsive to, the inner 
needs, motives, and experiences of others” (p. 11).  A more recent definition (Gough, 1987, p. 7) 
described a highly psychologically minded person as “more interested in why people do what 
they do than in what they do; good judge of how people feel and what they think about things.”  
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  On close examination, the Py Scale of the CPI does not appear to be an appropriate 
measure of PM.  For example, the emphasis in Gough’s (1987) definition is on the “other.”  
Neither the definition nor description of high scoring individuals suggests that psychological 
mindedness involves introspection or self-understanding (Conte & Ratto, 1997).  Some items 
have a degree of face validity, the statement “I have a tendency to give up easily when I meet 
with difficult problems” suggests a person who is resourceful enough to concentrate on a 
problem.  Others do not: “We ought to pay our elected officials better than we do” or “I would 
like to write a technical book” do not appear to describe a person who is interested or responsive 
to others. Grant (2001) points out that the scale makes no attempt to specify the factors that 
comprise PM.  Conte and Ratto (1997) cite that a definite weakness of the scale is that the 
manual does not provide a detailed description of Gough’s scale construction procedures.  Test-
retest reliability is rather low (r ranges .46 to .65) and only one study (Yalom, Houts & 
Zimerberg, 1967) has assessed the predictive validity of the Py scale.  Pre-treatment scores were 
not correlated with interviewer ratings of improvement in psychosocial adjustment following 
dynamic group therapy.  Hall (1992) concludes that given these factors the Py scale should not 
be considered a valid measure of PM. 
2.1.6 The Self-Consciousness Scale 
 Farber (1985) used the private self-consciousness subscale of Fenigstein’s (1975) Self-
Consciousness Scale to measure PM.  Farber asserts that private self-consciousness, defined as 
the “habitual attendance to one’s thoughts, motives and feelings” (Turner, Scheier, Carver & 
Ickes, 1978, p. 285) is the construct most closely related to psychological mindedness.  Farber 
(1985) reasoned that the private self-consciousness subscale closely mirrored his definition of 
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 PM as the disposition to reflect upon the meanings and motivations of one’s own and other’s 
behavior.  The private self-consciousness subscale consists of 10 items that measure self-
reflection (i.e. “I reflect about myself a lot,” “I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings”).  
Farber (1989) while stipulating to the potential positive aspects of PM (increased self-awareness 
and self-acceptance) was interested in investigating a potential downside of PM.  He remarks “an 
alternative view, however, is that psychological mindedness may interfere with spontaneity, self-
esteem, emotional health, and emotional responsiveness” (Farber, 1989, p.10).  Using this scale, 
Farber (1989) investigated the relation of PM to emotional responsiveness and self-esteem.  He 
found that high PM individuals experienced a more expansive affective life than others do, but 
also tended to have lower self-esteem. 
 In a review of Farber’s study (1989), McCallum and Piper (1996) comment that perhaps 
it is a better measure of critical self-scrutiny than psychological mindedness. Grant (2001) 
observes that although Farber regards private self-consciousness as being synonymous with PM, 
there are differences between them.  For example, although both constructs involve an 
examination of one’s mental and emotional processes, PM is a process directed at the 
explanation or understanding of one’s own and others’ behavior, and private self-consciousness 
is an awareness of one's own thoughts, feelings, and behavior.  Thus, rather than being 
synonymous with PM, private self-consciousness is probably one of a number of constructs that 
combine to form PM.  By contrast, the PM Scale (Conte, Ratto & Karusa, 1996) is more 
comprehensive in scope, assessing both self-reflection and reflection regarding others. 
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 2.1.7 Psychological Mindedness Scale (PM Scale) 
 The PM Scale (Conte et al., 1996) is the only self-report measure of psychological 
mindedness that has been subjected to ongoing psychometric assessment (Conte, Buckley, Picard 
& Karusa, 1995; Conte et al., 1996).  It was designed to measure a patient’s suitability for 
dynamically oriented psychotherapy and to determine the extent to which it can predict other 
variables related to psychotherapy outcome.  According to Conte and Ratto (1997) the scale is 
not theoretically based, as it does not attempt to operationalize psychoanalytic variables.  
However, the authors assert that it does have a theoretical frame of reference in that it attempts to 
measure characteristics such as a willingness to commit oneself to the therapeutic alliance and a 
basic agreement with those values and norms associated with good prognosis in dynamic 
psychotherapy.   
 The factor analysis (Conte et al., 1996) performed on 256 psychiatric outpatients revealed 
the following five factors (with each factor loading at .40 or above):  (a) willingness to try and 
understand oneself and others; (b) openness to new ideas and capacity for change; (c) access to 
one’s feelings; (d) belief in the benefits of discussing one’s problems; and (e) interest in the 
meaning of one’s own and others behavior. 
 The PM scale is a 45-item scale with adequate psychometric properties (Conte et al., 
1990, 1995, 1996).  As an adaptation of this scale was utilized in the present study, a more 
detailed description of the psychometric properties is provided in the following chapter.  An 
advantage to this scale is that the items represent a synthesis and integration of multiple 
definitions of PM.  Although Conte et al. (1990) states that the scale was designed to measure a 
patient’s suitability for dynamically oriented psycho-therapy, the items appear to be trans-
theoretical in nature tapping into characteristics representing the PM construct.   
  21
 2.1.8 Twenty Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
 The absence of psychological mindedness may be subsumed under the construct of 
alexithymia.  The construct encompasses a cluster of cognitive and affective characteristics that 
are virtually the obverse of several central features of PM.  The construct emerged from clinical 
observations over several decades that certain patients respond poorly to psychoanalysis and 
other insight-oriented psychotherapies because of a limited ability to describe and differentiate 
affects (Taylor & Taylor, 1997).  As noted by Taylor and Taylor, Horney (1952) described these 
patients as lacking emotional awareness, having a paucity of inner experiences, minimal interest 
in dreams, concreteness of thinking, and externalized style of living.   The salient features of the 
alexithymia construct are thought to reflect a deficit in the cognitive processing and regulation of 
emotions.   
 The TAS-20 is a 20-item self-report measure (Bagby, Taylor & Parker, 1994).  Each item 
is scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale.  It has been shown to have strong psychometric 
properties (Taylor & Taylor, 1997).  The authors reported good internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .81) and test-retest reliability (r = .77).  It consists of three factors:  (a) difficulty 
identifying feelings, (b) difficulty describing feelings, and (c) externally oriented thinking.  
Although there is overlap between PM and alexithymia, there is a significant difference between 
them.  Alexithymia is a narrower construct in that it is predominantly focused on the emotional 
domain; whereas, PM encompasses all three (cognitive, emotional, and behavioral) dimensions 
of human experience.  In their concluding comments about the value of the TAS, Taylor and 
Taylor (1997) note: 
the prospects for successful psychotherapy are greatly reduced for individuals 
who score high on measures of alexithymia, as such individuals are factually 
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 oriented, unanalytical in their thinking and are unable to elaborate on inner 
feelings and fantasies. (p.97) 
2.1.9 Videotape and Interview 
2.1.9.1 The Psychological Mindedness Assessment Procedure (PMAP) 
McCallum and Piper (1990) developed the PMAP, a videotape measurement of PM 
derived from psychoanalytic theory.  These authors (1990) defined PM analytically as the ability 
to identify unconscious intra-psychic conflicts and relate them to a person’s difficulty.  They 
developed the PMAP to assess the unique abilities required of work within analytically oriented 
therapy, because they wanted to assess suitability for psychodynamic treatments.  Consequently, 
they suggest that their measure for PM may not be applicable to therapies outside of a 
psychodynamic approach.   
The PMAP has been found to have adequate psychometric properties (McCallum & 
Piper, 1990).  Inter-rater reliability for this study between two judges on 20 participants, using 
interclass correlation, was .95 (p = .001).  It is individually administered and requires about 15 
minutes to complete.  The videotape presents simulated patient-therapist scenarios to which the 
patient is asked to respond.  Actors following scripts developed to reflect various components of 
therapeutic process portray the interaction.  The scenarios begin with an actress-patient 
describing a recent event in her life to her male therapist.  In the first scenario, the woman 
describes seeing from a distance, her former husband (a woman struggling with loss through 
divorce).  After viewing the tape, the patient is assessed for his or her general impressions.  For 
example, “what seems to be troubling this woman?” The PMAP differentiates nine levels of PM, 
with the criteria for each level reflecting basic assumptions of psychoanalytic theory.  These 
assumptions include psychic determinism, the unconscious, unconscious conflict, inner 
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 ambivalence, and defense mechanisms.  This measure has been used in a number of studies 
related to assessing the relation between PM and outcome reviewed in the following section.   
2.1.9.2 Projective Techniques 
 Wolitzky and Reuben (1974) developed a projective technique and assessed PM in 
accordance with their psychodynamic definition, based on therapists’ subjective scoring of 
responses to the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT).  The authors defined PM as “a tendency to 
understand or explain behavior in psychological terms” (p.26).  Fourteen male undergraduates 
participated as paid volunteers.  Subjects were presented with two prerecorded TAT stories told 
by Person A and Person B and instructed that the stories a person tells about the cards reveal 
something about his/her personality such as fears, attitudes, motives, and so on.  Subjects were 
then asked to tell their impressions about the stories they had heard.  A scoring system was 
devised based on 10 characteristics (motives, conflict, affect, defense, etc.) determined to 
represent PM.  A judgment by two raters (undergraduate psychology majors) was made on the 
subject’s recognition on the presence or absence of a given characteristic (e.g., conflict, “he is 
torn between two desires”).  A higher score represented greater PM.  The subjects’ ratings were 
then compared to an expert.  The measure of accuracy was the combined global judgment of the 
two independent raters of the degree of similarity between the subjects’ and experts’ ratings.  
  Reliability was adequate.  Correlations between the two raters of total PM scores for 
personality descriptions were .74, .78, and .79 when compared to the expert.  In a measure of 
internal consistency, all 10 characteristic scores correlated positively with the total PM score:  
The range was from .33 to .83 (mean = .60).  Higher PM scores were associated with greater 
accuracy in personality interpretations.  This use of this measure of PM was not referenced in the 
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 literature in research involving the construct.  However, an adaptation of the technique was 
utilized in the development of an assessment of PM for use with children and adolescents.     
2.1.9.3 Assessing the Psychological Mindedness of Children and Adolescents 
The measurement of psychological mindedness reviewed thus far has primarily focused 
on the adult population.  Hatcher, Hatcher, Berlin, Okla, and Richards (1990) are the first 
researchers to develop a measure for assessing psychological mindedness in the child and 
adolescent population and approach PM from a psychodynamic orientation.  As such, three lines 
of PM are emphasized in the development of their measure:  the growing understanding of 
internal, individual sources of motivation; the developing ability to recognize the simultaneous 
presence of several, often conflicting motivations; and the awareness of the use of self-deception 
to protect oneself against painful self-awareness. 
Their sample included 179 children, equally divided by gender, including 60 fifth-graders 
(mean age, 10.4 years), 60 eighth-graders (mean age, 13.6 years) and 59 12th-graders (mean age, 
17.7 years).  In assessing PM, two different procedures were used, one to assess PM toward 
others, the other toward self.  Separation of assessing self and others was prompted by the idea 
that PM toward others is more straightforward than PM toward self, because it does not require 
self-reflection.  
 PM toward others was assessed by using two fairy tales as stimuli.  Participants were 
read Cinderella and the Emperor’s New Clothes (fairy tales were simplified one-page versions). 
The story was read aloud twice . . . [and] presented in counterbalanced design—
one-half heard Cinderella first, and one-half heard The Emperor’s New Clothes.  
During the readings each child could follow the text of the fairy tales in their own 
booklet.  If Cinderella was read first, the children were asked, ‘What kind of 
person was Cinderella?  Describe her.’  The second question was, ‘Why was 
Cinderella so nice to people who were mean to her?  Write some reasons why she 
acted that way.’  The third question was ‘Why were the stepsisters so mean to 
Cinderella?’  Write some reasons why they were so mean to her.  (p. 68) 
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The answers to the questions were rated using a four category rating scale designed to 
identify progressions in the child’s descriptions of the fairy tale characters.  Responses 
progressed in a hierarchical fashion, the criteria for higher-level responses requiring more 
sophistication and complexity than those at a lower level.  An example of a fourth level rating is 
illustrated in a participant’s response to the question, “why was Cinderella so nice to people who 
were mean to her?”  The response, “she was so shy and reserved, she was afraid of them” (p. 69).  
The response represents higher level, abstract concepts (interacting psychological entities were 
recognized; concepts of internal conflict, need for self-deception were used). 
PM toward self was assessed in a two-step process. 
The child is asked to write stories to two TAT-type cards.  The first photograph 
shows an 8-10 year-old child of indeterminate gender looking at a broken guitar.  
The second photograph shows a mother and three small children embracing in the 
foreground.  In the background, a man sits at the table eating.  The child was 
asked to write a story about each one.  The subjects were instructed to include a 
beginning, middle and end in the story, and to tell what the people in the story are 
thinking and feeling.  The children were asked to reflect on their story and write 
what they felt the story might tell about themselves, and to explain the links 
between the story and their ideas about what the story reveals about them. (p. 69) 
 
Participants were then rated on a six-item scale in a similar fashion to the rating scheme 
described above.  For example, at the lowest end, the participant denied the relevance of the 
question, “This story does not relate to me at all” (p. 70).  At the higher end, the participant’s 
self-observation contains a complex set of motives with interactions among them, “Like the girl 
in the story, I am jealous of my baby sister, even though I also love her” (p. 70). 
Reliability of the scales was good to moderate.  Scores for the fairy tales were produced 
by three sets of raters.  The mean inter-rater reliabilities between each score were k=. 82 
(Cinderella) and k=. 85  (Emperor).  In measuring PM toward others, reliability was established 
by comparing the two fairy tales tasks through correlation (r = .79, p<. 001) and estimating 
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 Cronbach’s alpha (coefficient alpha=.83).  Reliability of PM toward self was established by 
comparing mean interrater reliability (k=.79) for the first TAT card and (k=. 69) for the second.  
Hatcher and Hatcher’s (1997) work highlights the achievement of a measurement that can 
reliably assess PM in this age group.  It also provides a basis for thinking about some of the 
cognitive and emotional skills that may support and influence the development of PM.  To date, 
the measure has not been used in other research. 
2.1.10 Section Summary 
The instruments reviewed above represent efforts to operationalize the construct of PM 
and accurately measure it.  Psychological mindedness has been regarded as an important variable 
in psychodynamic therapy (McCallum & Piper, 1990; Tolar & Reznikoff, 1960) and more 
recently other theoretical approaches (Grant, 2001).  Yet, the number of instruments available to 
measure PM is relatively small in number, most likely due to the conceptual ambiguity that has 
surrounded the construct.    
As a result of conceptual ambiguity, there are some limitations associated with measures 
of PM.  Hall (1992) observes that a number of the self-report measures such as the Py of the CPI 
(Gough, 1975), the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, 1975), and the Insight Test (Tolar & 
Reznikoff, 1960) have been used without any comment or attempt at justification.  She 
contributes this shortcoming to a lack of a universally accepted model of PM leaving researchers 
to choose instruments consonant with their particular purposes.  Different aspects of PM are 
emphasized depending on the author’s conceptualization.  For example, the Self-Consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein, 1975) measures PM exclusively in relation to the self and does not consider 
PM in the context of relationship to others.  The TAS-20 (Bagby, Taylor & Parker, 1994) 
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 measurement of alexythymia focuses more on the emotional than cognitive aspects of PM when 
the prevailing view is that PM involves both (Appelbaum, 1973; Conte et al., 1996; Grant, 2001; 
Hall, 1992).  The PMAP (McCallum & Piper, 1990) and Insight Test (Tolar & Reznikoff, 1960) 
emphasize psychoanalytic concepts raising the question of generalizability to other theoretical 
approaches.  
Some of the instruments have been used frequently (PMAP, Py of the CPI Scale, PM 
Scale, TAS-20) whereas some have not, other than the development of the measure (Wolitzky 
and Reuben’s projective technique, 1974; Hatcher and Hatcher’s assessment of PM in children 
and adolescents, 1997).  For the purpose of this study, the PM Scale (Conte et al., 1996) will be 
utilized as a measurement of the construct. Unlike other instruments, the PM Scale is not wedded 
specifically to a theoretical approach and defines PM broadly by synthesizing various definitions 
of PM in the literature. 
Research involving the use of these instruments is presented in the following sections, 
beginning with empirical evidence regarding the relation of PM to treatment outcome. 
2.1.11 Empirical Studies of Psychological Mindedness and Treatment Outcome 
Although there have been variant but related definitions of PM and a limited number of 
assessment procedures, the literature supports PM as a clinically relevant construct evidenced by 
the attention it has garnered both formally and informally.  McCallum and Piper (1990) maintain 
that the psychotherapy literature conveys a consensus regarding the relevance of the dimension 
of patient PM for all forms of psychodynamic therapy.  Therapists often intuitively assess a 
patient’s PM within a few psychotherapy sessions as an indicator of how he or she might benefit 
from the process.  In this section, the empirical evidence regarding the relation of PM to 
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 treatment outcome will be reviewed.  McCallum and Piper (1990) are the primary researchers 
who have conducted studies in this area.  Most studies have focused on the adult population with 
some containing a sub-sample of adolescents.  The results on the relation between PM and 
outcome has been mixed.     
An early study by Yalom et al. (1967) failed to find that PM predicted outcome in 
“dynamic-interactional” group therapy.  Forty outpatients, ages 19-45, whose diagnostic 
classification was primarily characterologic or neurotic were placed in five short-term groups.  
Subject’s PM was assessed by both the Py Scale of the CPI (Gough, 1957) and therapists’ 
subjective assessments.  The finding that PM did not predict treatment outcome is difficult to 
interpret.  First, measurement of PM consisted of subjective opinion on unreported criteria, and 
second, a Py Scale of the CPI does not appear to adequately assess PM (Conte & Ratto, 1997; 
Hall, 1992).   
Abramowitz and Abramowitz (1974) investigated the relationship between initial 
assessments of insight, using the Insight Test and group therapy outcome.  Twenty-six college 
students (mean age = 21) were divided into either insight-oriented or non insight-oriented 
groups. Their results indicated that highly insightful patients improved more on measures of 
psychological functioning when they participated in insight-oriented therapy as opposed to 
supportive therapy.  The highly insightful patients did no better than those with lower insight in 
supportive therapy.  These results are promising with respect to specifying a match between 
patient and therapy approach; however, they should be interpreted with caution because of the 
small sample size.  The authors also note that the failure to find a relation between PM and 
outcome in the non-insight group might be attributed to use of the senior investigator as the sole 
therapist in the study. 
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 Piper, Joyce, Rosie, and Azim (1994) completed a study on 99 psychiatric outpatients, 
most of whom received a diagnosis of affective and personality disorders.  Patients were treated 
in a day treatment setting with group therapy as the mode of intervention.  The study included a 
small proportion of adolescents.  The sample had a mean age of 33 years (SD=9.6, range=14-57).  
The PMAP (McCallum & Piper, 1990) was utilized to measure PM.  It was predicted that 
psychological mindedness and a group process variable, “patient work,” would favorably predict 
treatment outcome.  Patient work (i.e., willingness to explore personal contribution to a problem 
and helping group members explore their personal contribution to a problem) was measured by a 
one-page, seven-point, Likert-type scale that ranged from “very little” to “very much” created by 
the authors.  Psychological mindedness had an independent, significant relation to improvement 
on several outcome variables including decrease in psychosocial symptoms, increase in social 
adjustment, and attainment of personalized target objectives.  Although the usefulness of this 
study as it relates to adolescents is limited, it provides evidence for a relation between PM and 
outcome in a sample of clients that included a small subset of adolescents. 
Piper, Rosie, Joyce, and Azim (1996) replicated these results in a day treatment setting 
with group therapy as the mode of intervention.  The study included 120 patients with diagnostic 
and demographic variables similar to the previous sample (Piper et al., 1994).  As in the earlier 
study, the sample included a small proportion of adolescents (range = 14-57) and utilized the 
PMAP.  PM was directly related to favorable outcome on three primary factors:  decrease in 
psychiatric symptomatology, increase in social adjustment and life satisfaction, and decrease in 
pathological dependency.  PM was also directly related to how hard patients worked in the 
program.   
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 In a subsequent study, McCallum, Piper, and O’Kelly (1997) explored the relation of PM 
to patient “work” and outcome in an Evening Treatment Program (ETP).  The study involved 
190 patients with mood and/or personality disorders participating in an intensive group 
psychodynamic evening treatment program.  The study reported a mean age of 33 years, with a 
lower age range of 16 without note of the upper limit.  The study investigated whether 
psychological mindedness was related to work (i.e., willingness to explore personal contribution 
to a problem and helping group members explore their personal contribution to a problem) and 
whether PM and work had independent contributions to outcome.  The results indicated a 
relation between PM and work and between work and outcome, but not between PM and 
outcome as in the previous study. 
The authors explored reasons for the inconsistency between this and the earlier results of 
the day treatment study (Piper et al., 1994).  The authors noted that patients in the ETP all tended 
to improve within the same range; whereas, patients in the day treatment study (1994) had more 
variable degrees of improvement.  They reasoned that the smaller outcome variance might 
account for the lack of findings in the more recent study.  The authors suggest that this result 
might be due to the number of participants in the two programs.  For example, the average daily 
census in the evening treatment program was quite a bit smaller than the day treatment program 
(25 vs. 43).  Due to the smaller census, patients would have been less likely to fade into the 
background, increasing the likelihood that other patients would have noticed and tended to 
counteract such a tendency.  Consequently, a more inclusive milieu may have been available for 
less suitable patients (lower PM patients).  The authors also examined the PM level of those 
patients who dropped out.  Of the 190 patients who started the program, 36 dropped out.  A t-test 
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 revealed that for this patient population, psychological mindedness was not significantly related 
to attrition.  
Conte, Plutchik, Jung, Picard, Karusa, and Lotterman (1990) found results consistent with 
Piper et al. (1994) investigating the relation of PM to outcome in a group of 44 adult, affectively 
disordered outpatients.  The PM Scale (Conte et al., 1996) was utilized in this study.  
Participants’ pre-therapy PM scores were found to be significantly correlated with the number of 
psychotherapy sessions attended, increase in global functioning, and decrease in psychosocial 
symptoms.  The results support the positive relation between PM and outcome, but are limited by 
the small sample size and exclusive focus on adults. 
Conte et al. (1996) attempted to replicate these findings on a larger sample of 116 
outpatients at the same clinic who attended at least four treatment sessions.  Patients did not 
differ demographically or diagnostically from the earlier sample of 44 patients.  As in the 
original study, a high level of PM at intake was significantly related to number of sessions 
attended.  However, the prediction of a positive relation between high PM and outcome (high 
levels of functioning (r=0.09) and low levels of symptoms (r=0.06) was not replicated.  Potential 
limitations highlighted by the authors included ratings made by an independent judge and a low 
percentage (36%) of returned surveys.  For example, the independent judges’ ratings were based 
on material contained in the patients’ charts and could be no more informed or accurate than the 
material.  The amount of information obtained from the patients themselves in the form of self-
report was also compromised because only about one-third returned their surveys. 
A similar finding was reported by McCallum and Piper (1990), utilizing the PMAP, who 
found that PM was predictive of remaining in short-term group therapy, but failed to find 
significant direct relation between PM and outcome measures.  Participants consisted of 109 
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 adult outpatients who presented to an outpatient walk-in clinic.  All patients were assessed as 
experiencing a prolonged or delayed grief reaction and most had affective and adjustment 
disorders.  This study included a large battery of outcome indices, including interpersonal 
functioning, psychiatric symptomatology, self-esteem, and personalized target objectives.  One 
possible explanation for this result is that 30% of the 109 patients who actually started treatment 
dropped out prematurely.  Although only 14% of the high PM patients dropped out, 53% of the 
low PM patients did not remain in treatment.  The disproportionate number of low PM patients 
who dropped out would affect group heterogeneity and possibly the ability to test the relation 
between PM and outcome adequately.  
Subsequently, McCallum, Piper, and Joyce (1992) explored whether PMAP scores 
predict treatment attrition in short-term psychodynamic group treatment involving 16 therapy 
groups.  Of the 109 patients who began therapy, 30.3% dropped out.  Three pretreatment 
variables (out of 49 pretreatment variables) differentiated those who remained in treatment from 
those who terminated prematurely.  These included low PMAP scores, severity of psychiatric 
symptoms, and severity of target objectives.  The authors concluded that low PM patients 
typically dropped out because they felt confused and frustrated with the psychoanalytically 
oriented therapy process; whereas, high PM patients were better suited for this theoretical 
orientation.  The results of this study should be interpreted with caution, however, because 
exploring 49 variables with only 109 subjects increases the statistical risk of finding significant 
variables by chance. 
In a related study, Tasca, Balfour, Bissada, Busby, Conrad, Cameron, Colletta, Potvin-
Kent, and Turpin (1999) explored whether three patient variables, PM, interpersonal problems, 
and chronicity of psychiatric problems, would predict completion status in an adult psychiatric 
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 day treatment program.  Of the 102 patients who entered the program, 57% completed the 
program and 43% did not.  PM was measured via the PMAP (McCallum & Piper, 1990).  Most 
patients had a diagnosis of affective and personality disorders.   
Patients who completed treatment had significantly higher levels of PM and fewer years 
(chronicity) of reported psychiatric problems than non-completers.  Those not completing 
treatment had lower levels of PM.  PM accurately classified 81% of completers and 45% of non-
completers.  However, PM did not on its own increase the probability of classifying completers 
and non-completers.  The PM by chronicity interaction was able to accurately classify 86% of 
completers and 52% of non-completers.  The results suggest that those with higher number of 
years of psychiatric problems were more likely to complete the program if they had higher levels 
of PM and were more likely to drop out if they had lower levels of PM.  To aid in interpretation, 
the authors also utilized a scatter plot with PM and chronicity on the axes and plotted regression 
lines for completers versus non-completers.  The results indicated that completer PM scores tend 
to increase as patient years of psychiatric problems increased.  The authors interpreted this 
finding to suggest that for those with more chronic problems, completion of an intensive day 
treatment program may require a higher level of PM.  Based on this finding, PM may act as a 
buffer of the overall negative impact of years of psychiatric problems.  
 In respect to outcome, a direct relation between PM and outcome was not assessed.  
However, in relation to completion status and outcome, about half who completed treatment 
showed improvement in interpersonal functioning and decrease in depression.  PM may play a 
role in a patient’s tenacity of staying with the treatment process, leading to improvement in 
functioning and decreased distress.  These results are consistent with earlier studies (Conte, 
1996; McCallum & Piper, 1990; McCallum, Piper & Joyce, 1992; McCallum, Piper & O’Kelly, 
  34
 1997) that differentiated patients’ PM scores and attrition, higher PM patients tending to remain 
and work in treatment. 
More recently, McCallum, Piper, Ogrodniczuk, and Joyce (2003) explored the relation 
among psychological mindedness, alexithymia, and outcome in four forms of short-term 
psychotherapy.  Data was derived from two comparative clinical trials of interpretive 
(psychodynamic) versus supportive therapy.  One study involved 107 patients receiving short-
term group therapy for patients with complicated grief.  The sample had a mean age of 43 years 
(SD=10.3, range = 19-67).  The other involved 144 patients diagnosed with affective and 
personality disorders who received short-term individual therapy.  The sample had a mean age of 
34 years (SD=9.6, range=18-62).  The authors were interested in investigating the empirical 
relation between PM and alexithymia, the relation that PM and alexithymia each had with 
treatment outcome, and the relative strength of PM and alexithymia as predictors of outcome in 
the four forms of therapy.  Psychological mindedness was measured by the PMAP and 
alexithymia by the TAS-20, both described above.  
An alexithymic patient is thought to lack psychological mindedness and the measurement 
of this construct (Bagby et al., 1994) has been utilized to demonstrate its absence.  The results of 
this study indicated that for both trials, the association between PM and alexithymia was small 
and not significant and therefore empirically independent. The therapy approach (interpretive vs. 
supportive) did not differentially affect the relation between either predictor variable or outcome.  
In regard to outcome, there were significant direct relations between PM and favorable outcome 
and between alexithymia and favorable outcome.  In the short-term group therapy and individual 
therapy trials, PM was respectively associated with improvement on grief symptoms and general 
symptoms.  Regarding alexithymia, there were significant direct relations in both the short-term 
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 group and individual therapy trials.  In the group therapy trial, there was improvement of grief 
symptoms, general symptoms, and life satisfaction.  In the short-term individual therapy trial, 
there was improvement on general symptoms and social adjustment.     
There was also an additive effect on the joint prediction of PM, alexithymia, and 
outcome.  In each trial, main effects were evident for both PM and alexithymia for only one of 
four outcome factors.  For short-term group and short-term individual therapies, PM was 
associated with a reduction in grief symptoms and alexithymia a reduction in general symptoms.  
Therefore the joint prediction was investigated for only these outcomes.  Significant main effects 
were again revealed for both trials.   In the short-term group therapy trial, 13% of the variance 
was accounted for in improvement on grief symptoms.  In the short-term individual therapy trial, 
8% of the variance was accounted for in improvement on general symptoms. 
The results of this study support the importance of these two patient characteristics for 
success in therapy.  Higher levels of PM and lower levels of alexithymia were associated with 
benefits from the four forms of therapy.  The authors comment the finding that the effect of the 
two variables on outcome was additive suggests that while both abilities influence patient 
response to therapy, their influence is virtually independent of each other.  Often conceptualized 
as opposite sides of the same coin, these results suggest that they may be two distinct capacities.  
The PM patient may or may not be alexithymic.  The authors speculate that PM may be a more 
cognitive process and alexithymia a deficit in emotional or experiential processes.   
 These results imply that patients most suited to psychotherapy (interpretive or 
supportive) are those with a high PM and low alexithymia.  However, the authors also caution 
that the process of therapy could affect changes in low PM and high alexithymia and recommend 
further studies examine change in these patient characteristics over time.  A number of theorists 
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 (Appelbaum, 1973; Farber 1989; Wolitzky & Reuben, 1974) view PM as a stable characteristic, 
but further investigation is needed to explore this possibility.   
Limitations of this study include the finding that added together both predictor variables 
accounted for only 13% of the outcome variance in group therapy and 8% in the individual 
therapy trial.  Even though the two predictor variables influence patients’ ability to benefit from 
therapy, there are other variables that also influence therapy.  The authors suggest these might 
include other patient characteristics or aspects of the therapy process, such as the amount of 
“work” contributed by the patient. 
In an extension of this work, McCallum, Piper, and colleagues have explored whether 
patient characteristics match to specific therapies.  Piper, Joyce, McCallum, and Azim (1998) 
investigated whether quality of object relations (QOR) and PM were related to outcome in two 
different types of psychotherapy (interpretive and supportive).  Quality of object relations refers 
to a person’s enduring tendency to establish certain types of relationships that range along an 
overall dimension from primitive to mature.  Mature object relations means the person enjoys 
equitable relationships characterized by love, tenderness, and concern for objects of both sexes.  
A tendency toward primitive object relations means the person reacts to perceived separation or 
loss of the object, or disapproval or rejection by the object with intense anxiety and affect.  PM 
as defined in this study is the ability to identify dynamic (intrapsychic) components and relate 
them to a person’s difficulties.  
The study included 171 psychiatric outpatients, the majority of who were diagnosed with 
affective disorders and personality disorders.  The average age of patients was 34.3 years (SD = 
9.6, range = 18-62).  Patients participated in 20 weekly individual therapy sessions.  Overall, 
QOR was directly related to favorable outcome in interpretive therapy (six of 12 outcome 
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 measures related to functioning) and supportive therapy (one measure of life satisfaction).  PM 
was directly related to improvement in both therapies.  One significant relation between PM and 
favorable outcome was found for interpretive therapy (general symptom improvement), three for 
supportive therapy (decreased interpersonal distress, improved behavioral functioning, and life 
satisfaction) and six for all patients (decreased distress, improved behavioral functioning, general 
symptom improvement, reduced anxiety, increased life satisfaction, decrease in maladaptive 
defenses).  The relation between high PM and interpretive therapy had been predicted because of 
the assumed usefulness of PM to understanding and working with interpretations, but for 
supportive therapy it was not.  The authors reasoned that high PM patients may have engaged in 
exploration of internal conflicts outside of therapy even if not encouraged to do so, or 
alternatively, PM may reflect a general ability to analyze conflicts and problem solve whether 
the conflicts are internal or external and therefore valuable to different theoretical orientations.  
In a later study, Piper, McCallum, Joyce, Rosie, and Ogrodniczuk (2001) examined these 
patient characteristics (QOR and PM) in relation to time-limited, short-term group therapy for 
complicated grief.  The patient sample was similar to the previous study (Piper et al., 1998).  
There were 139 psychiatric outpatients who were randomly assigned to either interpretive or 
supportive group therapy.  The patients were scheduled for 90-minute sessions for 12 weeks.   
The average age of the patients was 43 years (SD = 10.3, range = 19-67).   
It was predicted that PM would be directly related to favorable outcome in both studies.  
It was also predicted that higher levels of QOR would be associated with more favorable 
outcome in interpretive therapy, and lower levels of QOR would be associated with more 
favorable outcome in supportive therapy.  The authors reasoned that patients with high QOR 
could better tolerate the more demanding aspects of interpretive therapy and patients with low 
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 QOR would benefit from the more gratifying aspects of supportive therapy.  Three areas of 
outcome were evaluated:  general symptoms, grief symptoms, and life satisfaction.  The results 
indicated that PM was directly related to favorable outcome on grief symptoms for both forms of 
therapy.  Grief symptom improvement included reduction in intrusive thoughts, reduced 
avoidance, and reduction in pathological grief symptoms.  The prediction of QOR also held true.  
High QOR patients had significantly better outcome in interpretive therapy and low QOR 
patients had significantly better outcome in supportive therapy.    
The authors considered the findings of high PM and QOR in relation to grief symptoms 
particularly relevant because the goal of the groups was to assist patients in adapting to the losses 
of people in their lives.  As in the previous study (Piper et al., 1998) the authors speculated that 
perhaps PM patients explored internal conflicts naturally within sessions even if they are not the 
focus as in interpretive sessions or perhaps outside of their sessions.  Alternatively, they suggest 
that PM may reflect a useful general ability to examine conflicts and solve problems, whether the 
conflicts are internal, as emphasized and explored in interpretive therapy, or external, as 
emphasized and explored in supportive therapy.   
2.1.12 Section Summary 
In sum, the findings on the relation of PM to outcome have been mixed although there 
have been more studies that have demonstrated a positive relation between PM and outcome than 
have not.  (See Table 1, next page.)  Earlier studies (Abramowitz & Abramowitz, 1974; Yalom, 
1967) are more difficult to interpret due to methodological issues or use of an instrument that 
may be questionable in its measurement of PM.  Studies conducted by Conte et al. (1990, 1996) 
were split with the later study failing to replicate the positive relation of PM to outcome.  Also of 
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interest in Conte’s studies is the finding that higher PM patients attended more treatment 
sessions.  McCallum et al. (1990, 1992) and Tasca et al. (1999) reported similar results finding 
that higher PM patients were more likely to remain in treatment even when there was no relation 
of higher PM to better outcome (McCallum, 1990).  This would suggest that higher PM plays an 
indirect role in a patient’s willingness to stay with the treatment process and potentially benefit 
from it.  Moreover, a study by Tasca et al. (1999) suggests that PM may contribute to compliance 
with treatment attendance over time.   
Tasca et al. (1999) found that patients with a higher number of years of psychiatric 
problems who also have higher PM were more likely to complete treatment.  These researchers 
also found that PM scores tend to increase as patient years of psychiatric problems increase.  
These findings raise an interesting possibility:  Does PM somehow buffer psychiatric distress 
and enhance coping skills?  In addition to enhancing treatment attendance, PM also appears to 
enhance patient participation in the treatment process.  Piper et al. (1996) and McCallum et al. 
(1997) found a significant relation between higher PM and a patient’s willingness to “work” in 
treatment.  In the Piper et al. (1996) study, higher PM was also related to better treatment 
outcome.  In McCallum et al. (1997), higher PM was related to “work” and “work” to better 
outcome but there was not a direct relation of higher PM to better outcome.  This might also 
suggest an indirect role of higher PM to enhanced outcome.  Perhaps higher PM patients may 
tend to work harder in treatment, be more likely to complete the process, and benefit from their 
efforts.   
 
First Author Subjects 
(N) 
Age Range Measurement PM Relation to 
Positive 
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Abramowitz (1974) 
 
Piper (1994) 
 
Piper (1996) 
 
McCallum (1997) 
 
 
Conte (1990) 
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McCallum (1990) 
 
 
Tasca (1999) 
 
 
McCallum (1998) 
 
Piper (2001) 
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26 
 
99 
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44 
 
 
116 
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171 
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19 – 45 
 
M = 21 
 
14 – 57 
 
14 - 57 
 
13 not stated 
 
 
M = 36 (SD=14) 
 
 
Adult 
 
 
18 – 65 
 
 
M = 37 (SD=9) 
 
 
18 – 62 
 
19 - 67 
CPI 
 
Insight Test 
 
PMAP 
 
PMAP 
 
PMAP 
 
 
PM Scale 
 
 
PM Scale 
 
 
PMAP 
 
 
PMAP 
 
 
PMAP 
 
PMAP 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Not Tested 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Not Tested 
 
Not Tested 
 
Not Tested 
 
Higher PM=Positive Relation to work 
 
Higher PM=Positive Relation to work.  
Work related to positive outcome. 
 
Higher PM=Positive relations to 
attendance. 
 
Higher PM=Positive relations to 
attendance. 
 
Higher PM=Positive relations to 
attendance. 
 
Higher PM=Positive relations to 
completion. 
 
Not Tested 
 
Not Tested 
Table 2-1  PM Relation to Outcome and Other Variables 
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Finally, recent studies (McCallum et al., 1998, 2003; Piper et al., 2001) have 
demonstrated a consistent relation between higher PM and positive outcome has been 
demonstrated.  This research group has broadened their testing of the relation to include 
individual therapy when most work on PM and outcome has included group therapy as the mode 
of treatment.  The positive results add to the repertoire of approaches in which the relation has 
been tested.   In addition, these researchers have also included therapeutic approaches 
(supportive) outside of psychodynamic therapy with positive results of a relation between higher 
PM and outcome.   
2.1.13 Empirical Studies Relating PM to Personal Characteristics 
One broad class of research has investigated the nature of psychological mindedness by 
correlating it with personality characteristics.  In this section, these studies are reviewed and 
include personality variables, ego function, emotional well-being, and self-esteem.  More recent 
studies have explored the relation of PM to attachment and cognitive style and are included in 
the review.  All of these studies have utilized the Psychological Mindedness Scale (Conte et al., 
1990) as a measurement of the construct.     
Conte, Buckley, Picard, and Karusa (1995) explored the construct validity of the PM 
Scale (Conte et al., 1990) to determine if personality traits would correspond with what one 
would expect in a psychologically minded individual.  The study utilized the Personality Profile 
Index (PPI; Plutchik & Conte, 1989) with a sample of 46 medical students who were receiving 
psychotherapy at a special personnel clinic at a university-based outpatient center.  Patients were 
diagnosed primarily with affective, anxiety, and adjustment disorders.  Eight dimensions of 
personality were rated:  acceptance, submission, passivity, depression, rejection, aggression, 
 
 assertion, and sociability.  PM scores were related to high assertiveness (r = .57; p< .001), 
sociability (r = .40; p< .01), low passivity (r = -.59; p< .001), and depression and conflict (r’s = -
.34 and -.30, respectively; p< .05).  Those students with high PM scores also tended not to be 
submissive (r = -.27; p< .10) and could be considered above average in their tendency to be 
accepting rather than rejecting of others (r’s = .24 and -.24, respectively; p< .10).  These results 
fit well with what one might expect from a psychologically minded individual.  That is, 
individuals who are interested in the meaning of their own and others’ behavior and who might 
derive insight from their discussions about their problems, would tend to be sociable, assertive, 
and accepting of others, and being low on rejection, more open to new ideas (Conte & Ratto, 
1997).    
PM has been described in the psychodynamic literature as an ego function (Conte et al., 
1995).  One might expect that increased understanding of the behavior of oneself and others 
would assist adaptive and coping functions.  Conte et al. (1995) explored the extent to which 
individual’s ego functioning corresponded in a manner that would be theoretically expected with 
a degree of psychological mindedness.  This investigation was conducted at the same outpatient 
clinic as the previous study, but with a sample of 192 regular clinic patients.  Patients were 
similarly diagnosed with affective, adjustment, or anxiety disorders, but also included patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and psychoactive substance disorders.  To test the relation between 
PM and ego functioning, the PM Scale (Conte et al., 1990) was correlated with a self-report 
measure of ego functions, the Self –Evaluation Questionnaire (SEQ; Conte et al., 1995).  The 
PM scale was associated significantly and positively with three ego functions:  mastery-
competence (r = .53; p< .001), synthetic-integrative functioning (r = .49; p= .001), and 
autonomous functioning (r = .29; p< .01).  Mastery-competence “reflects an individual’s actual 
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 performance in relation to his or her capacity to interact with and master the environment” 
(Conte et al., 1995, p. 15).  Such a person might be able to synthesize internal and external data 
because of their openness and interest in the meaning of such data.  Similarly, one who is 
insightful and has access to feelings would be expected to function relatively autonomously and 
have the potential to more effectively deal with the ambiguities of daily life.  As Conte et al. 
(1995) observed, “a person who has a strong ego is one who may be more willing to explore 
dangerous psychological events” (p.16).  For example, “he or she may be more willing to face 
embarrassment or potential shame as a consequence of disclosing personal information or to face 
the possibility of uncovering unacceptable impulses within himself or herself” (Conte et al., 
1995, p.16).  These results support the notion that high PM patients have the requisite ego 
functioning that would make them good candidates for psychotherapy. 
A study by Truedeau and Reich (1995) compared levels of psychological mindedness 
with measures of mental well-being and self-consciousness.  Eighty-nine students in a small 
liberal arts college took part in the study.  PM was measured by the PM Scale (Conte et al., 
1995), well-being was measured by a shortened form of the Psychological Well-Being Scale 
(Ryff, 1989), and self-consciousness was measured by the Private Self-Consciousness Scale 
(Feningstein, Schier & Buss, 1975).  Self-consciousness was defined as the act of focusing one’s 
cognitive reflection specifically on oneself.  As predicted, the results indicated a positive linear 
relation between PM and mental well being (r = .31; p<. 01), as well as between PM and self-
consciousness (r = .45; p< .01).  However, there was no positive linear relation between self-
consciousness and mental well being (r = - .03; p>.05).  A multiple regression analysis indicated 
that as PM increases, the level of mental well being increases, and the level of self-consciousness 
decreases.  The authors interpreted these results to suggest that self-awareness and social 
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 curiosity are good for one’s mental health.  However, although self-consciousness is positively 
correlated with PM, self-consciousness has a negative effect on mental well-being.  These results 
suggest that just as PM may have a positive influence on mental health, excessive self-scrutiny 
may be deleterious to mental health.  There may a point when too much inward attention and 
preoccupation with self is contrary to one’s well-being.  Overall, the results of this study would 
suggest that PM is associated with emotional adjustment in this sample of non-clinical 
participants. 
For the most part, clinicians and researchers have tended to view psychological 
mindedness as a positive dimension of personality.  However, Farber (1989) in a study of 
negative consequences of PM, investigated the hypothesis that individuals with high PM suffer 
from two deficits, specifically, a lack of emotional responsiveness and lower self-esteem.  The 
sample included 215 graduate students who were administered five self-report inventories.  In 
this study, PM was measured by the Self-Consciousness Scale (Feingstein et al., 1975).  Three 
measures assessed differing aspects of emotional expressiveness and one measured self-esteem.  
Results of the study indicated that highly psychologically minded individuals were not less 
emotionally responsive than others were; in fact, they exceeded others’ scores on all measures of 
emotionality except one, that of verbal expressiveness.  However, with respect to self-esteem, 
highly psychological individuals did seem to have lower self-esteem than their less psychological 
counterparts.  Farber (1989) attributed these findings to: 
a tendency of a psychologically minded person to look for hidden meanings, to 
refuse to accept the world at face value, and to avoid denial…even if denial would 
spare pain . . . making one’s shortcomings easier [to see] and makes viewing the 
world and oneself in exclusively positive terms far more difficult. (p. 215) 
 
  45
 Farber (1989) noted that PM “brings with it an awareness that may leave one feeling more 
emotionally attuned but also more aware of disturbing aspects of oneself that cannot be 
overcome and of possibilities in oneself that cannot be realized” (p. 216). 
The tendency of the psychologically minded person to be more emotionally attuned or 
perhaps possessing intuitiveness to one’s own or other’s feelings has raised the question as to 
where such skills originate.  Alvarez, Farber, and Schonbar (1998) investigated the hypothesis 
that increased psychological mindedness would be positively associated with adult perceptions 
of having grown up with rejecting or otherwise depriving or inadequate parents.  They cited 
research that supported the idea that early family dynamics among psychotherapists, a group 
thought to be especially highly psychologically minded (Ford, 1963; Westen, Huebner, 
Boekamp, Lifton & Silverman, 1991) is marked by a relationship with a dysfunctional mother 
(Racusin, Abramowitz & Winter, 1981).  Kohut’s (1971) theoretical writings also reflect the 
theme of maternal influence in the determination of career choice and development of PM, “It is 
the mother’s personality whose influence is predominant . . . It may lead to the development of a 
sensitive psychological superstructure with unusually great ability for perception and elaboration 
of psychological processes in others” (p.277).  Park and Park (1997) also discuss this perceptual 
ability as it relates to personal intelligence, a concept thought to be related to PM.  As defined by 
Gardner (1983), personal intelligence refers to information-processing capacities about 
psychological processes of self and others (Park & Park, 1997).  Although related to PM, 
personal intelligence is a broader construct involving intrapersonal, interpersonal, stress 
management, motivational, general mood, and adaptability factors (Bar-On & Parker, 2000).  
Gardener reasoned that the expression of personal intelligence “is markedly vulnerable to 
cultural and caregiver influences, requiring appropriate life experience for full and healthy 
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 development . . .[and a skill that] requires a history of healthy education and reinforcement 
during the developing years” (Park & Park, 1997, p.134). 
Park and Park (1997) believe that borderline personality disorder, (BPD; DSM-IV, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is a function of being innately gifted with respect to 
personal intelligence and being psychologically abused because of that same gift.  In their work, 
they posit that infants who are highly reactive and easily distressed may be high in personal 
intelligence.  Such infants are also hypothesized to be more depressed, anxious, and to have 
lower self-esteem.  Complicating their lives further, the authors contend that children with high 
personal intelligence can be perceived as threatening by their parents, especially narcissistic 
mothers.  The authors believe that this interaction is fertile ground for the development of BPD.  
These authors view BPD as a pervasive manifestation of unhealthy personal intelligence.  For 
example, patients with BPD appear to have a heightened perceptivity of the feelings and motives 
of others manifested in the manipulative induction of feelings in others like those the patients 
themselves experience.  Therefore, one point of view regarding the etiology of the perceptual and 
intuitive skills characteristic of individuals with high personal intelligence and perhaps high PM 
could be related to early negative experiences with caretakers.  Alvarez et al. (1998) explored 
this possibility.  
Alvarez et al. (1998) utilized the PM Scale (Conte, 1990) and the Parent-Child Relations 
Questionnaire II (PCR II; Siegelman & Roe, 1979) to test their hypothesis that PM is negatively 
correlated with individuals’ perceptions of parental lovingness and positively correlated with 
reported parental rejection.  The sample included 120 college students equally divided by gender.  
Contrary to the prediction, the less rejecting the mother was perceived to be, the more 
psychologically minded the individual.  In addition, for women, PM was significantly correlated 
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 with the presence of maternal love and the absence of maternal demandingness.   The authors 
concluded that the results lend credence to the notion that PM may be associated with good 
parenting experiences, specifically with mother.  They suggest that PM may be learned through 
modeling and imitation of mother’s empathic perceptions, affective responses, and behavior.  
Noted limitations to this study include the correlational design  (thus causal relationship between 
PM and parenting behavior cannot be drawn) and that it is based on recollections which may 
make them subject to distortion. 
The results of this study suggest PM relates to a felt sense of attachment security.  Beitel 
and Cercero (2003) explored this possibility as part of an investigation of the construct validity 
of the PM Scale (Conte et al., 1990).  The authors were interested in whether the PM Scale 
correlated with the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992), a broad 
transtheoretical measure of personality.  They were also interested in extending the work of 
Alverez et al. (1998) by examining the role of attachment security and PM. 
The sample included 187 undergraduate students with an average age of 19.5 years (SD = 
3.50).  The NEO-FFI assesses five dimensions of personality:  Neuroticism, Extroversion, 
Openness, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness.  The Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment 
(IPPA; Armsden & Greenberg, 1987) was utilized to assess attachment to mother, father, and to 
peers.  The authors predicted that PM would correlate positively with extraversion and openness 
and negatively with neuroticism.  PM was also predicted to correlate positively with attachment 
to mother, father, and peers.  Results indicated that PM was positively correlated with openness-
to-experience (r = .40; p< .01), extraversion (r = .37; p< .01) and negatively correlated to 
neuroticism (r = -.33; p< .01).  The attachment to peers variable was associated both moderately 
and positively with PM (r = .31; p< .01).   
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 To assess the relation of PM to personality and attachment security, a standard regression 
analysis was conducted.  The four significant predictors accounted for 31% of the variance.  All 
three-personality variables were significant predictors of PM.  Of these, openness to experience 
was most predictive, followed by extraversion and neuroticism.  The only attachment variable 
that significantly predicted PM was attachment to peers.  The authors speculated that the finding 
that neither attachment to mother and father predicted PM might be the result of the focus being 
on current relationships.  For example, a retrospective measure of parent attachment might have 
been related more to PM, as was the case in the Alvarez et al. (1998) study.  The overall result of 
this study is in line with Conte’s (1995) finding that PM is related to personality variables that 
could be beneficial to individuals engaged in the psychotherapy process.  The authors also note 
that the inverse association between PM and neuroticism can be interpreted to mean that PM 
may be associated with healthy internal models of experience.    
 As an extension of this work, Beitel, Ferrer, and Cecero (2004) conducted a study that 
explored the relation between PM and cognitive style.  They interpreted the results of their 
earlier study (Beitel & Cecero, 2003) to suggest “that highly psychologically minded people are 
emotionally well adjusted, assertive, and curious to learn about themselves and their 
environment” (p. 569).  They theorized that this profile would be associated with a cognitive 
style that is marked by flexibility, tolerance, and realistic thinking.  As previously noted, various 
definitions of PM have emphasized the cognitive aspects of PM (Appelbaum, 1973; Farber, 
1985; Grant, 2001; Hall, 1992; Hatcher & Hatcher, 1997), yet until recently there had been no 
empirical investigation of the relation between them.  
Beitel et al. (2004) investigated the relation of PM to three cognitive-style variables:  
ambiguity tolerance (AT); locus of control (LOC); and magical thinking (MT).  The authors 
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 predicted that PM would be positively related to AT and LOC and negatively related to MT.  The 
authors chose these variables because they have been theoretically associated with descriptions 
of high PM individuals.   For example, the authors note that ambiguity-tolerant people are 
comfortable in dealing with shades of gray in life and do not rely on all or nothing thinking.  
They compare this to the Conte et al. (1995) description of high PM individuals as able to 
“reconcile or integrate discrepant or potentially contradictory attitudes, values, affects, and 
behaviors” (p.14).  Locus of control is defined as the degree to which individuals attribute 
control in their life to internal or external resources (Rotter, 1966).  Ryan and Cicchetti (1985) 
regarded patients who viewed the source of their disturbance as external to the self as being at a 
low point in terms of their PM as compared to those who describe the experience of problems as 
arising within the self.  Magical thinking involves providing explanations that contradict the 
accepted laws of nature (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).  A high PM patient might attribute events 
to psychological causes, “I did it because I was angry,” where a magically minded person to 
supernatural causes, “the devil made me do it” (Beitel et al., 2004).   
The sample included 200 undergraduate participants from an urban liberal arts college 
with a mean age of 26 years (SD =9.70).  As in the previous study, the PM Scale (Conte et al., 
1990) was used to measure psychological mindedness.  The cognitive style variables were 
measured as follows:  AT by the Revised Scale for Ambiguity Tolerance (MacDonald 1970), 
LOC by the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966), and MT by the Magical Ideation Scale 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).  As predicted, PM was positively related to AT (r = .17. p< .05) 
and inversely related to LOC (r = - .30, p< .01) and MT (r = - .30, p< .01).   The results of this 
study suggest a cognitive profile for PM that includes flexibility, a sense of personal agency, and 
tendency for realistic thinking (Beitel et al., 2004).  These characteristics would likely be 
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 beneficial to those engaged in the psychotherapy process.  For example, high PM patients tended 
to report tolerance for ambiguity.  Beitel et al. (2004) observes “Psychological processes are 
ambiguous because they are not directly observable and must be inferred” (p.578).  It would 
follow that individuals interested in such processes would be better able to tolerate the ambiguity 
associated with them.  Because the psychotherapy process requires a certain degree of integration 
of data, one must be aware that there are multiple data in the first place.  In regard to LOC, high 
PM patients tend to ascribe control to themselves, rather than the environment.  The authors 
suggest that it is likely that this internal orientation would be used to advantage by a PM minded 
person, for example to cultivate a sense of autonomy.  The positive experience would likely 
increase interest in matters psychological helping to consolidate one’s internal, autonomous 
orientation.  This internal focus would also explain why high PM patients would be less likely to 
engage in magical thinking.  The authors conclude that high PM people tend to invoke internal 
psychological causes such as thoughts and feelings to explain life events. 
2.1.14 Section Summary 
 Overall, the studies reviewed suggest that psychological mindedness is associated with 
healthy emotional development.  A profile is drawn of a high PM individual as one who is open 
to experience, assertive, extraverted, accepting of others, introspective, and possessing a flexible 
cognitive style.  Despite these positive characteristics, there is some suggestion there may be a 
“cost” to increased PM such as the possibility of having too much self-awareness as in Farber’s 
(1985) finding that higher PM patients had lower self-esteem.  He suggests that the clarity of 
one’s self-appraisal may make it difficult to deny shortcomings.  Also, on the negative side is 
Park and Park’s (1997) suggestion that exceptional emotional attunement (displayed by patients 
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 with BPD) may be born of unhealthy relationships with caregivers.  The two studies reviewed 
here (Alavarez, 1998; Beitel & Cerecero, 2003) do not lend support to this suggestion.  These 
results are in line with the view of most authors (Bar-On & Parker, 2000) that PM is more 
associated with positive events than negative ones.  Farber and Golden (1997) in a review of PM 
as a characteristic of psychotherapists summarized the advantages, which include feeling special 
and having an increased tolerance for the complexities of people, which can lead to becoming a 
more sensitive, compassionate, and genuinely forgiving person. These authors also warn of the 
potential downside.  In their words, the highly psychological person is “wiser but sadder.” 
In regard to limitations, it is noted that the primary design of the studies reviewed in this 
section is primarily correlational, and therefore no causal inferences can be drawn.  Additionally, 
there are only a small number of studies that have examined the influence of early caregiving on 
the development of PM.  More research in this area could increase understanding of 
environmental influences on the development of PM.  Finally, most of the studies reviewed here 
have occurred with non-clinical samples.  The generalizabilty of the results should be reviewed 
with caution because the general mental health of this population may be quite different from 
those individuals entering treatment.  
If psychological mindedness is primarily viewed as a positive characteristic, then the 
development of skill could be beneficial to those wishing to increase understanding of self and 
others.  In the following section, the evolution of psychological mindedness will be examined. 
2.1.15 Evolution of Psychological Mindedness in Children and Adolescents 
A secondary aim of this proposal was to examine the stability of PM within an adolescent 
population.  As noted in the introduction, PM has been described as a “gift,” “trait,” or 
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 “tendency” (Appelbaum, 1973; Farber, 1985; Wolitzky & Reuben, 1974), implying PM is an 
attribute held by some but not all individuals.  The question becomes is psychological 
mindedness a skill that can be influenced?   A number of authors have speculated that 
psychological mindedness is relatively stable after a person reaches adulthood (Conte & Ratto, 
1997; Dollinger, 1997; Taylor & Taylor, 1997).  For example, over a two-week period Conte et 
al. (1990) reported the test-retest reliability for a non-clinical population was r (22) = .92, p < 
.001.  Also in a non-clinical population, McCallum and Piper (1990) reported a test-retest 
reliability coefficient as r (13) = .76, p < .001.  However, after patients participated in an 
intensive evening treatment program (McCallum et al., 1997), the correlation coefficient yielded 
by a Pearson correlation was r (152) = .40, p < .001.  Although the latter correlation is smaller 
than in the non-clinical population, it still appears to remain relatively stable.  It may be possible 
that the smaller correlation in the clinical population reflects less motivation as a result of 
treatment ending.  Despite these results, it may be premature to conclude the skills involved in 
PM are not susceptible to influence. 
Most authors conceptualize PM as developing in childhood (Dollinger, 1997; Hatcher & 
Hatcher, 1997; Mena & Cohen, 1997).  Hatcher and Hatcher (1990, 1997) are the research team 
that has focused most extensively on the development of PM in children and adolescents.  They 
view PM as a complex cognitive capacity that involves the child’s growing comprehension of the 
motives, attitudes, and characteristics of the self and others.  According to these authors, PM is 
built on both cognitive and emotional skills acquired during the course of development and can 
be seen as a term characterizing children’s ability to make sense of themselves and the world in 
psychological terms.  The influence of these skills on the development of PM will be examined 
below.   
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 New evidence suggests that children much younger than previously thought are capable 
of thinking psychologically about themselves and others.  This promising area of investigation is 
known as “theory of mind.”  Theory of mind research is concerned with the child’s 
understanding of the mind—their developing knowledge and beliefs about the mental world and 
mental phenomena, for example, knowledge about everyday activities such as remembering, 
thinking, and dreaming (Wellman, 1990).  By observing others and the self, the child begins to 
develop a theory of mind, in other words, a theory of how others organize their conscious and 
unconscious mental activities that feel, perceive, will, and especially reason (Mish, 1983).  
Welman (1990) provides a backdrop for the study of theory of mind in his examination of 
Piaget’s work.  Historically, research interest in children’s understanding of the mind goes back 
to Piaget’s (1929) early writings.  Piaget argued that mental phenomenon, because of its 
nonobvious nature was confusing for young children.  Piaget focused on two aspects in relation 
to understanding of the mind:  an understanding of the nature of mental entities (e.g., thoughts, 
dreams) and the use of psychological reasoning to explain human actions (e.g., how intentions 
and desires cause and explain human actions).  With respect to mental entities, Piaget claimed 
that young children, preschoolers, were “realists” who think of mental entities as tangible and 
physical.  For example, that dreams are objective pictures and in public view.  Piaget argued that 
young children often incorrectly applied psychological reasoning to physical objects, and, 
conversely often incorrectly applied physical reasoning to human acts.  Piaget’s view that 
children do not share adult notions of mind and instead have a non-mental perspective on events 
is clear in the hypothesis he offers below. 
Let us imagine a being, knowing nothing of the distinction between mind 
and body . . . His notions of self would undoubtedly be much less clear than ours.  
Compared with us he would experience much less sensation of the thinking of self 
within him, the feeling of a being independent of the external world . . . The 
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 psychological perceptions of such a being would be entirely different from our 
own.  Dreams, for example, would appear to him as a disturbance breaking in 
from without . . . We shall try to prove that such is the case with the child.  The 
child knows nothing of the nature of thought, even at the stage when he is being 
influenced by adult talk concerning “mind,” brain,” intelligence.  (Piaget, p. 37) 
 
Piaget’s view that young children had limited capacity for mental reflection has been 
challenged in recent years.  Since the mid 1980’s there has been renewed interest in the nature 
and development of children’s understanding of the mind (Astington, 1993; Wellman, 1990).  In 
general, contemporary research shows in contradiction to Piaget, that a mentalistic understanding 
of persons emerges rapidly in most children (Gergely, 2002).  Wellman (2002) attributes the 
advances to interviewing methods that more carefully probe children’s judgments in answer to 
certain questions.  For example, Piaget often came to his conclusions by asking open-ended 
questions such as “what are dreams?”   Contemporary researchers (Astington, 1993; Wellman, 
1990) utilized questions that gave children a choice between contrasting alternatives (see 
example below). 
 As described by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001), theory of mind is an approach to a 
larger topic:  everyday or folk psychology—the construal of persons as psychological beings, 
interactors, and selves.  The phrase, theory of mind, emphasizes that everyday psychology 
involves seeing oneself and others in terms of mental states—the desires, emotions, beliefs, 
intentions, and other inner experiences that result in and are manifested in human action.  
Because persons have certain desires and relevant beliefs, they engage in intentional acts, the 
success and failure of which result in various emotional reactions. 
 Evidence for early development of theory of mind has been demonstrated in numerous 
studies (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Siegal & Beattie, 1992; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001; 
Wellman & Estes, 1986).   Research in this area has focused on how, when, and in what manner 
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 does an everyday theory of mind develop?  The question has been investigated using a variety of 
tasks and studies that focus on the child’s developing understanding, for example, conceptions of 
desires, emotions, beliefs, belief-desire reasoning, or psychological explanation (Astingdon, 
1993; Wellman, 1990).  In particular, researchers have focused on children’s understanding of 
belief, especially false belief.  This is because mental-state understanding requires realizing that 
such states may reflect reality and may manifest in overt behavior, but are nonetheless internal 
and mental, and therefore distinct from real-world events, situations, or behavior.  A child’s 
understanding that a person has a false belief, one whose content contradicts reality, provides 
evidence that children are capable of mental representation earlier in their development than 
previously thought (Wellman et al., 2001).  
 As described by Wellman (1990), the classic false belief task presents a child with the 
following scenario.  Maxi puts his chocolate in the kitchen cupboard and leaves the room to play.  
While he is away (and cannot see) his mother moves the chocolate from the cupboard to a 
drawer.  Maxi returns.  Where will he look for the chocolate, in the drawer or in the cupboard?  
Most three-year-olds will answer in the drawer because they do not understand that Maxi has a 
false belief about the chocolate’s location.  Four- and five-year-old children often pass such 
tasks, judging that Maxi will search in the cupboard although the chocolate really is in the 
drawer.  These correct answers provide evidence that the child knows that Maxi’s actions depend 
on his beliefs rather than simply the real situation itself, because belief and reality diverge.  This 
discovery of the mind occurs within a “belief-desire” psychology, which may be a universal or 
innate human framework for psychological understanding.  According to Wellman (2002), this 
everyday psychology provides explanations and predictions of action by appeal to what the 
person thinks, knows, and expects, coupled with what he or she wants, intends, or hopes.  Why 
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 did Maxi go to the drawer?  Because he wanted his chocolate and thought it was in the drawer.  
It assumes that people have desires that spur them to actions in the world, and these actions are 
based on beliefs about the nature of the world.  Once the child develops an understanding of the 
representational activity of the mind, he or she can begin to predict the behavior of others based 
on inferences about their beliefs and desires.  Pretend and deception become possible because the 
child understands that one can act on beliefs that are not in fact true. 
 As discussed by Hatcher and Hatcher (1997), these cognitive abilities form the basis for 
the development of psychological mindedness.  Failure to develop these abilities is associated 
with catastrophic failure to understand the self and others.  This deficit has been demonstrated in 
studies with autistic individuals.  The theory of mind hypothesis for autism purports that the 
severe social disconnectedness evident in even high functioning individuals with autism is due to 
an impairment in their ability to construe persons in terms of their inner mental lives (Baron-
Cohen, 1995).  A study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Firth (1985) demonstrated high-functioning 
children with autism who were able to reason competently about physical phenomena failed false 
belief tasks, whereas Down syndrome and other delayed populations did not.  False-belief 
research with the autistic population demonstrates that individuals with this disorder lack theory 
of mind, are unable to imagine that others have minds of their own, and cannot recognize the 
subjectivity of their own minds (Astington, 1993; Baron-Cohen, 1995).  Studies such as these 
provide support for a developmental model of theory of mind.  For example, in cases of 
developmental delays, children from progressively older age groups gave responses that reflected 
a progression through the same stages and in the same sequence as the responses of younger 
children without developmental delays. 
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  Research on theory of mind has focused on children’s early development.  However, as 
described by Wellman (1990), once the theory of mind capacity emerges, children complete their 
understanding of themselves and others with increasing sophistication.  For example, by age 
seven, children have begun to recognize enduring traits (assertiveness, stubbornness) in 
themselves and others, motivational organizers that structure the person’s behavior and sense of 
self.  The child fits new information into the developing theory and continually revises it.  Over 
time, children’s understanding of themselves and others is based less in terms of external events 
and more in terms of internal enduring beliefs and motivations.  Theory of mind research 
provides a framework for an individual’s emerging capacity to think psychologically about the 
self, others, and events.  
 Also, relevant to the study of PM is the area of social cognition.  Social cognition refers 
to how individuals conceptualize and reason about their social world, the people they watch and 
interact with, relationships with those people, the groups in which they participate, and how they 
reason about themselves and others (Santrock, 2001).  One aspect of social cognition is the 
concept of social perspective taking (SPT), a construct similar to psychological mindedness.  It 
refers to the ability to free oneself of one’s own view and to recognize the thoughts, feelings, and 
motives of the self and others (Shantz, 1983).  Similarly, PM is defined as interest in achieving 
psychological understanding of the self that involves understanding meaning and motivation of 
behavior of self and others.  As described by Menna and Cohen (1997), SPT has its roots in 
Mead’s (1934) theory, in which the ability to take another person’s role is considered to be a 
fundamental process in socialization of the self and Piaget’s (1965) theory of cognitive 
development in which social perspective taking arises from the ability to decenter.  Decentration 
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 refers to the ability to consider multiple perspectives of a situation.  Selman (1980) applied these 
concepts to the social domain with the introduction of the construct of social perspective taking.  
 Selman (1980) found that perspective taking has stage-like properties reflecting 
increasing differentiation and integration of the self and others and continues to develop into 
adolescence and adulthood.  Social perspective taking is assessed by having children and 
adolescents respond to dilemmas concerning conflicts with peers and authority figures.  He 
applied this work to different areas of the social world including moral development, friendship 
formation, and interpersonal negotiations.  Selman’s (1980) work is important in understanding 
the development of the ability to take others’ perspectives, a necessary skill in PM.  It showed 
that children’s reasoning in each social domain develops from an uncoordinated, individualistic 
understanding to an understanding that coordinates two perspectives, and then to an 
understanding that individual perspectives must be viewed in relation to a complex social 
system.  In later work Selman and colleagues examined the role of SPT in the domain of 
interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS; Selman & Demorest, 1984; Selman, Beardslee, 
Schultz, Krupa & Podorefsky, 1986).  The INS model addresses how people coordinate their 
understanding of others’ thoughts, feelings, and motives in conjunction with their own in 
attempting to balance inner and interpersonal conflicts.  The INS model posits that interpersonal 
understanding proceeds through a series of stages that reflect increasing differentiation and 
integration of the social perspectives of the self and others (Selman & Demorest, 1984; Selman 
et al., 1986).  Selman argued that this understanding varies developmentally with social 
perspective taking becoming increasingly more sophisticated.  As children become more aware 
of the perspectives of others, they incorporate this information into their decision-making 
process and produce higher-level strategies based on this new ability to coordinate perspectives.  
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 The developmental progression begins with a simple egocentric judgement (the self’s own 
viewpoint is the same as the others) between the ages of three and five years.  This gives way to 
a self-reflective level between six and eight when the individual recognizes the self as a possible 
focus of others’ perspectives.  Then between nine and 15 years of age, there is a mutual 
perspective, which is characterized by the ability to recognize the perspective of self and other 
even though they are not in relation to one another.  Finally, moving into adulthood, there is an 
understanding of a network of perspectives binding individuals into a social system (Selman et 
al., 1986).  
 What then are the implications for social perspective taking and PM?  Psychological 
mindedness requires the ability to step outside oneself and coordinate differing views of a 
situation.  Selman and colleagues’ works (1980, 1984, 1986) provide evidence for a 
developmental model of how this ability becomes more sophisticated over time.  For example, 
during adolescence, individuals further develop their ability to perceive the point of view of 
others and to analyze their own and others’ behaviors and emotions (Selman, 1980; Selman et 
al., 1986).  These skills provide a basis for an individual’s capacity for self-observation, a key 
component of PM.  As discussed by Habermas (1986): 
social perspective-taking not only involves a veridical interpretation of thoughts 
and emotions of other persons, but also the development of qualitatively distinct 
forms of reasoning. . . It also involves a developing understanding of intrinsic 
psychological characteristics and capacities (in terms of SPT) of individuals, 
because the development of the competence for SPT, which the child can reflect 
upon, has implications for the child’s view of what he or she as well as persons in 
general are able to do. (p. 770) 
 
 Whereas Selman’s theory of social perspective-taking assumes that the development of 
self-understanding occurs at a parallel pace with the understanding of others, Hatcher et al. 
(1990) argue against the contention that PM towards others and the self occur simultaneously.  
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 These researchers investigated the relations between the growth of abstract thinking in children 
and adolescents, self-observational abilities, and the capacity to function with PM in relationship 
to others.  They had three groups of 60 fifth, eighth, and 12th  graders complete two measures of 
formal operations and a new instrument they created (previously described in section two, this 
chapter) to evaluate PM, first toward the self and second towards others.  PM was defined as 
“[psychological understanding involving] comprehension of the motives, attitudes, and 
characteristics of the self and others” (p. 308).  Drawing upon Piaget’s view that formal 
operational thought and the capacity to introspect emerge simultaneously during adolescence 
(Piaget, 1969), the researchers hypothesized that a greater capacity for abstract reasoning would 
be associated with a greater capacity for self-understanding and for understanding others at every 
age level.  Additionally, they assumed that capacity for PM toward the self and others would 
increase significantly with age.  And finally, they hypothesized that no gender differences would 
emerge in the capacity for PM directed towards the self and others, or in the capacity for abstract 
reasoning.  The authors found that the development of abstract reasoning skills did not directly 
correlate with measures of the development of PM in a simple way for either gender, although 
both PM and abstract thinking did significantly increase with age.  While PM was shown to be a 
developmental concept, self-understanding and psychological understanding of others appear to 
follow “two separate developmental lines and different gender patterning. . . ” (p. 318).  More 
specifically, it seems that PM towards others “begins as a skill connected with the ability to think 
abstractly.  For girls, PM towards others becomes autonomous and connected with self-
observational skills. . . but for boys it remains connected with the ability to think abstractly and 
remains weakly linked to self-observational skills” (p. 317).  Just as Piaget demonstrated that 
abstract reasoning is not achieved by all adults, it appears that the ability to understand others 
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 may be somewhat easier to attain than self-understanding.  In short, not all people achieve the 
capacity for “full self-observation” (p. 318).  On the basis of their results, Hatcher and colleagues 
concluded that many children and adolescents may be “ripe” for more psychologically minded 
interventions.  In particular “high school girls may be able to work in insight-oriented modalities 
as well as those boys in junior high and high school who are cognitively able” (p. 322). 
  Also key to the construct of psychological mindedness is the child’s growing 
understanding of emotions.  Hatcher and Hatcher (1997) underscore the importance of affective 
understanding in the development of PM.  They cite Kennedy’s (1979) work that postulated 
psychological mindedness involves a two-part process including the understanding of oneself 
and others and the ability to tolerate painful feelings.  These two lines of development are 
interrelated:  The child’s increasing capacity to tolerate feelings both contributes to and is aided 
by an increased understanding of the meaning and the nature of those feelings.  As the child’s 
ability to deal with emotion increases, he or she turns less to externalizing methods for thinking 
about and dealing with internal states (Kennedy, 1979).  Kennedy traced three stages in this 
developmental line.  These stages include children under age five with their limited capacity for 
self-observation of wishes and feelings, latency age children who have increased capacity for 
self-awareness but rely heavily on external factors to explain and deal with internal states, and 
adolescents who have increased intellectual abilities to understand the self. 
 The child’s growing understanding of feelings follows a developmental progression as 
demonstrated in the work of Harter and Budin (1987).  Their research shows the child’s growing 
cognitive capacity to understand the experiencing of increasingly complex feelings.  Harter and 
Budin assessed the ability to conceptualize different combinations of feelings in 126 children 
between ages four and 12 years divided equally by gender.  They were shown a set of 
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 photographs of same-gendered children depicting a range of positive and negative emotions.  
Children chose photographs of either two same or two different valence feelings, placed on 
boards with line drawings to facilitate the questions being asked (e.g., “how could you at the 
very same time have the first feeling about one thing and the second feeling about a different 
thing?”).  Harter and Budin demonstrated that at about five years of age, children hold the belief 
that only one emotion can be experienced at a time, and deny the possibility of having more than 
one feeling.  At about seven years of age, children can acknowledge having two different 
positive feelings toward the same target (e.g., person or situation).  By nine years, children can 
express same-valence feelings to different targets.  By age 10, children can describe having 
opposite valence feelings toward a single target: “I was mad at my brother for hitting me but 
pleased that my father gave me permission to hit him back.”  Finally, at mean age 11.3 years, 
children are able to describe opposite-valence feelings toward a single target: “I was happy that I 
got a present, but mad that it wasn’t what I wanted.”  Harter and Budin found that children 
reached these levels of emotional understanding at considerably varying ages (SD = 1.5 at each 
level) and thus cautioned clinicians to not overestimate their child patients for understanding 
their mixed emotions.  This work is relevant to the study of PM because it shows the child’s 
increasing capacity to understand his or her feelings. 
 The emotional and cognitive skills described above form the foundation of PM and 
continue to evolve into adolescence.  There is general consensus among researchers that, with 
development, an adolescent shows an increasing use of psychological and social reasoning 
concepts.  Damon and Hart’s (1982) model describes broad developmental shifts in the focus of 
self-understanding.  They hypothesize a gradual transition from descriptions of one’s physical 
self, to the active self, to the social self, to the psychological self.  Harter (1988) suggests a 
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 similar sequence, beginning with a focus on physical attributes (e.g., size, age, gender, 
appearance, possessions), followed by a shift to behaviors more indicative of one’s actions, 
skills, and preferences.  At higher levels of development there is a shift to more psychological 
dimensions, such as one’s emotions (affects and moods), one’s motives (intentions and 
attributions), and one’s cognitions (attitudes and the thought process itself).  Hatcher et al. (1990) 
summarized the evolution that occurs over time.  In late childhood, there is a shift from seeing 
the self as a collection of physical attributes and action capacities to recognition of the difference 
between the outside world and the mind of the individual.  At the onset of adolescence there is a 
global undifferentiated sense of mind.  There is a sense of the mind’s power to reflect on and 
control itself, but a lack or recognition of the complexities and contradictions in the self.  In later 
adolescence, there is a capacity to recognize the complexities and contradictions, using 
increasingly complex conceptualizations of the self. The general implication is that the growing 
child gains a richer and more differentiated understanding of himself or herself over time 
drawing on cognitive capacities that are developing across a number of domains. 
2.1.16 Section Summary 
 In summary, the cognitive and emotional skills involved in psychological mindedness 
follow a developmental trajectory with these skills becoming increasingly more sophisticated 
over time.  Theory of mind research demonstrates that these skills emerge early in life and also 
provide a framework for how an individual begins to perceive oneself and others and to reason 
psychologically.  Research demonstrating that autistic individuals fail to develop a theory of 
mind supports a genetic link to an individual’s ability to construe people and events 
psychologically.  In addition to cognitive abilities, age, level of social perspective-taking, 
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 accretions in emotional and self-understanding all contribute to a shift toward an increasingly 
complex psychological mindedness.  That such a shift can take place poses a challenge to the 
view that the ability to engage in psychologically minded activities is comparable to a special 
inborn talent that an individual either has or lacks.  Rather, it appears that individuals may be 
capable of varying degrees of PM.  This directly relates to one of the assumptions of this thesis:  
that increments in adolescent patients’ PM may be influenced by participation in therapy, 
specifically a cognitive-behavioral treatment approach (described in the following chapter) that 
focuses on teaching skills that are at the foundation of psychological mindedness.   
  65
 3.0  CHAPTER  
3.1 METHODS 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This study had two purposes.  The first was to explore the relation between psychological 
mindedness and treatment outcome in an adolescent population.  The second was to investigate 
whether accretions in PM can be gained by participation in a treatment approach that teaches 
cognitive skills involved in PM.   
3.1.2 Sample 
Data for this study were derived from a clinical trial of three different psychotherapeutic 
interventions for adolescent depression (Brent, Holder, Kolko, Birmaher, Baugher, Roth, Iyengar 
& Johnson, 1997).  Funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, Depressed Adolescent 
Suicide Attempters:  A Clinical Trial (R01 MH46500) occurred over a five-year period 
beginning in 1991.  David Brent, M.D., was the principal investigator.  The clinical trial 
compared cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), systemic-behavior family therapy (SBFT), and 
non-directive supportive therapy (NST).  It was predicted that patients treated with CBT and 
SBFT relative to patients treated with NST would show greater improvement in the prevalence 
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 and severity of depression and suicidality.  The main finding was that CBT resulted in more 
rapid and complete symptomatic relief of depression than either SBFT or NST.   
The sample for this investigation (IRB Number: 0506080) included all available 
participants from the clinical trial.  The participants were 107 adolescents of normal intelligence, 
between the ages of 13 and 18, living with at least one parent or guardian, meeting criteria for 
DSM-III-R (American Psychological Association, 1987) major depressive disorder (MDD), and 
with an intake Beck Depression Inventory > 13 (BDI, Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988).  Participants 
were not diagnosed with psychotic, bipolar, obsessive-compulsive, and had no eating disorder, 
no substance abuse, or ongoing physical or sexual abuse.   
Participants were recruited for the clinical trial from the Services for Teens at Risk Clinic 
at Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic.  Approximately one-third of the participants were 
recruited by an advertisement in the local newspaper, the remainder were self-referred or referred 
by parents or professionals.  No demographic or clinical differences were observed between the 
participants responding to advertisements and those recruited by clinical referral.  Incentives for 
participation included free treatment and participant payment for completion of evaluations. 
Composition of the sample was 83% Caucasian, 76% female, with an average age of 15.6 
years (SD=1.4).  According to Hollingshead’s (1975) Four-Factor Index of Socioeconomic 
Status (SES), family SES of adolescents participating in the study included the following:  8% 
upper class, 8% upper middle class, 29% middle class, 41% lower middle class, and 10% lower 
class.  The percentage of adolescents living with two parents was 57% (See Table 3.1 on next 
page.) 
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 Table 3-1 Demographic Characteristics of Subjects 
 
Characteristics CBT 
(N = 37) 
SBFT 
(N = 35) 
NST 
(N = 35) 
Mean  (SD) Age 
 
Gender % 
Male 
Female 
 
Ethnicity% 
Caucasian 
African American 
Other 
 
Mean (SD) Socio-economic Distribution, %* 
 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
 
Live with two parents, % 
Does not live with two parents 
15.7 (1.3) 
 
 
24.3 
75.7 
 
 
75.7 
13.5 
10.8 
 
 
 
5.4 
16.2 
21.6 
43.2 
13.5 
 
56.8 
43.2 
15.4 (1.4) 
 
 
22.9 
77.1 
 
 
66.6 
11.4 
0.0 
 
 
 
11.4 
5.7 
34.3 
45.7 
2.9 
 
57.1 
42.9 
15.7 (1.5) 
 
 
25.7 
74.3 
 
 
85.7 
8.6 
5.7 
 
 
 
8.6 
1.4 
31.4 
34.3 
14.3 
 
57.1 
42.9 
*Demonstrated by Hollingshead (1975) Four-factor Index of Socioeconomic Status 
3.1.3 Hypotheses 
1. Adolescents rated higher in psychological mindedness as compared to adolescents rated 
lower in psychological mindedness will experience greater improvement in severity of 
depression following psychotherapy as measured on the self-rated Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, 1987) and level of social and psychiatric functioning as assessed on the 
interview rated Children’s Global Assessment Scale (Shaffer et al., 1982). 
2. Patients treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy will show a greater increase in PM as 
compared to systemic behavioral family therapy and nondirective supportive therapy. 
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 3.2 DESIGN 
The proposed study used a correlational design for hypothesis one and experimental design for 
hypothesis two with short-term longitudinal data collection.  The first hypothesis explored 
whether higher PM was associated with greater improvement in level of depression and 
functioning.  For this hypothesis, analysis was conducted on all subjects, taking treatment 
assignment into consideration.  The measure of psychological mindedness was taken at the 
beginning of treatment.  A comparison of level of depression and functioning at the beginning of 
treatment was made and change from beginning to end was documented.  The second hypothesis 
explored the possibility of treatment effects on the development of PM.  For this hypothesis, 
analysis was conducted within the specific therapy groups of CBT, SBFT, and NST.  Pre- and 
post-measures of psychological mindedness was taken and any change from the beginning to end 
of treatment was documented (See Table 3.2). 
Table 3-2  Timeline of Measures 
 
Session Pre 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12-16 
Measure 
Beck Depression Inventory 
 
Children’s Global Assessment Schedule 
 
Psychological Mindedness Scale 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
 * 
 
 * 
 
 * 
3.2.1 Randomization 
Once participants had given informed consent, they were randomized to one of the three 
treatments:  CBT, SBFT, or NST.  To ensure comparability among the groups, the Begg and 
Iglewicz (1980) modification of the Efron biased coin toss (1971) was used balancing on sex, 
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 number of parents in the household, and clinically significant suicidality (i.e., ideation with a 
plan or an attempt).  Patients who made a suicide attempt were removed from the study.  In 
addition, patients who were still seriously symptomatic at midpoint were evaluated.  A clinical 
decision for removal was based on a failure to achieve notable improvement from intake to 
midpoint, resulting in a recommendation for open treatment--usually pharmacotherapy.  
3.2.2 Treatment 
Treatment consisted of 12 to 16 sessions provided in the same number of weeks.  The 
three treatment conditions were similar on number of treatment hours (CBT = 12.5, SD = 3.9; 
SBFT =11.7, SD = 5.1; NST = 11.6, SD = 4.3) and duration of weeks (CBT = 13.9, SD = 3.9; 
SBFT =12.0, SD = 5.4; NST =12.9, SD = 4.9).  Following is an explanation of the treatment 
approaches utilized in this study. 
CBT, developed by Beck Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979), and adapted in the study for 
adolescents, aims to identify false beliefs, unhealthy moods, and problematic behaviors.  A major 
premise of CBT is that depression results from a patient’s negative or inaccurate interpretation of 
his or her experiences.  CBT seeks to relieve emotional distress and other symptoms of 
depression by focusing on the patient’s misinterpretations, self-defeating behaviors, and helping 
the patient observe the relation between their negative thoughts and feelings.  The therapist and 
patient on an on-going basis carry out analysis of maladaptive cognitive-behavioral sequences.  
CBT incorporates educational methods such as structure, clarification, feedback, reflection, 
practice, and homework.  The teaching component also involves therapist modeling of new ways 
of thinking and approaching problems.  There is emphasis on therapist and patient collaboration 
with therapist acting as a guide. 
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 The second treatment, SBFT, as applied in this study is a combination of two treatment 
approaches.  The first phase of treatment is drawn from Alexander and Parson’s (1982) 
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) in which the therapist joins the family in a series of reframing 
maneuvers in order to obtain maximal engagement and commitment from each family member.  
After engagement and clarification of the problems and goals, the treatment moves to the 
behavioral component as developed by Robin and Foster (1989).  According to Robin and 
colleagues the etiology of family conflict involving adolescents relates to deficient 
communication, poor problem solving skills, and structural difficulties (e.g., inappropriate 
alliances, such as a weak parental alliance and a strong-child alliance).  During this phase of 
treatment, the therapist focuses on socialization to the treatment model, positive practice both in 
session and at home, and a commitment on the part of all family members to self-monitor and 
positive practice. 
The third treatment, NST, is a treatment well suited to adolescents because of its non-
directive and non-threatening nature, and its use of empathic feedback.  The main goals of NST 
are to establish, maintain, and build rapport, provide support, and to provide a supportive 
empathic adult to whom the patient can ventilate (Strupp & Binder, 1984).  The therapist 
encourages the patient to monitor his/her feelings, to learn to identify them and get in touch with 
them, and to share them with the therapist.  The therapist refrains from giving advice or making 
interpretations, but instead, resorts to reflective listening, exhortations and statements of support, 
clarification, and provision of accurate empathy. 
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 3.2.3 Procedures 
Adolescents participating in this investigation were asked to complete self-reports as part 
of a battery of measures used in the clinical trial.  Participants received a bound booklet of nine 
measures assessing a variety of areas at assessment, the sixth, and final 12th session of treatment.  
Participants also completed a measure of depression at each treatment session.  For a complete 
description, see Brent et al. (1997).  Participants completed the booklet at home between therapy 
sessions, returning it the following week.  For the purposes of this investigation, analyses were 
limited to two measures:  psychological mindedness and depression.  Assessment of level of 
functioning was made by an independent, master’s-level clinician as part of a clinical interview 
conducted separately with the parent and the adolescent.  Interviews were conducted at the same 
intervals described above.  The parent and adolescent each received $50 for completion of the 
final interview and the booklet of measures. 
Of the 107 subjects who entered the study, 101 (94%) completed a PM Scale at the 
beginning of treatment and 88 (82%) at the final session.  At intake, 107 (100%) had an 
assessment of  functioning and measure of depression.  At mid point (six weeks), 94 (88%) had 
an assessment of functioning and measure of depression.  Ninety-nine (93%) received a final 
assessment of functioning and 97 (91%) measure of depression.  
3.2.4 Measures 
3.2.4.1 Psychological Mindedness   
The Psychological Mindedness Scale (Conte, Ratto & Karusu, 1996) is a recently revised 
measure of psychological mindedness designed to measure a patient’s suitability for dynamically 
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 oriented psychotherapy and to predict other variables related to psychotherapy outcome.  This 
45-item scale is a modified version of a 65-item scale used by Lotterman (1979) in a pilot study.  
The original scale consisted of 45 self-report items and 20 items that comprised a multiple-
choice questionnaire completed after reading two clinical vignettes.  The present PM Scale 
contains only the 45 self-report items, some of which were revised or reworded.  The PM Scale 
assesses both self-understanding and an interest in the motivation and behavior of others.  
Examples of items include “I often find myself thinking about what made me act in a certain 
way,” “I’ve never found that talking to other people about my worries helps much,” and “I am 
curious about the reasons people behave as they do.” 
Items are responded to on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly 
disagree).  The PM Scale yields a score from 45 to 180.  Based on unpublished data from 313 
psychiatric outpatients collected by Conte, a score of 123, 131, and 142 represent the 25th, 52nd, 
and 76th percentiles respectively (Conte, personal communication, April 3rd, 2000).  Conte and 
Ratto (1997) reported content validity in the original scale was determined by asking five 
experienced clinicians to judge whether the items adequately covered a representative sample of 
the conceptual domain as they understood it clinically and as it is described in the literature.  
They agreed that it did.  They further agreed that if endorsed, 24 of the items loaded positively 
for PM whereas 21 loaded negatively.  These latter items are reverse scored.  A total PM score is 
obtained by summing the scores for all items. 
Reliability for the scale has been promising.  Conte et al. (1990) reported good internal 
consistency (coefficient alpha = .86) based on the data of 69 adult psychiatric outpatients.  The 
coefficient alpha was recomputed on the data of an additional 250 outpatients and again showed 
good internal consistency for this population (.87).  Test-retest reliability over a two-week period 
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 for a sample of 22 normal adults was .92 indicating good stability (Conte, Ratto, Clutz & Karusa, 
1993).  
A study of 44 psychiatric outpatients provided preliminary evidence for the predictive 
validity of the PM scale.  Their pre-therapy PM scores were found to be significantly correlated 
with the number of psychotherapy sessions attended with an increase in global functioning and a 
decrease in psychosocial functioning.  However, in a later study by Conte et al. (1996), these 
findings did not replicate with the exception of attendance to treatment.  These investigators 
acknowledge the need for further work in this area. 
There is good evidence for the construct validity of the PM Scale.  Evidence for divergent 
validity of the PM Scale has been established by Bagby, Taylor and Parker (1994).  In an 
investigation of the psychometric properties of their scale for alexithymia, they found significant 
negative correlations between it and the PM scale, as well as between psychological mindedness 
and each of their scale’s three factors, defined as difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty 
describing feelings, and externally oriented thinking.  The alexithymic state was characterized 
(Moore & Fine, 1990) by “poorly differentiated and poorly verbalized affects that do not serve 
the signal function adequately (do not communicate effectively)” (p.11).  These findings suggest 
the PM Scale is measuring the converse of the concept of alexithymia.   
In addition, a factor analysis (Conte et al., 1996) was performed on 256 psychiatric 
outpatients and revealed the following five factors (with each item loading .40 or above):  (a) 
willingness to try to understand oneself and others; (b) openness to new ideas and capacity for 
change; (c) access to one’s feelings; (d) belief in the benefits of discussing one’s problems; and 
(e) interest in the meaning of one’s own and others’ behavior. 
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 In the clinical trial the PM Scale was adapted for use with adolescents.  A total of 12 
items were deleted due to lack of relevance to the adolescent population (Kolko, personal 
communication, May 5th, 2000).  The reduced version yields a score form 33 to 132.  Examples 
of items include “I think that people who are mentally ill often have problems which began in 
their childhood,” “At work, if someone suggested a different way of doing a job that might be 
better, I’d give it a try,” and “I think that no matter how hard you try, you’ll never really 
understand what makes people tick.”  A factor analysis was conducted by this researcher on the 
reduced version of the PM Scale (refer to Appendix A) using the principal components method 
with orthogonal (Varimax) rotation. The scales of 88 study participants served as the database.  
There was good internal consistency at baseline (coefficient alpha = .84) and at post 
measurement (coefficient alpha = .81).  A total of four of Conte et al.’s (1996) five factors were 
retained accounting for 43% of the variance.  These items had factor loadings greater than .35.  
They were, in order:  (a) interest in the meaning of one’s behavior and that of others; (b) access 
to feelings; (c) willingness to try and understand oneself and others; and (d) openness to new 
ideas and capacity for change.  The following coefficient alpha’s were reported for the individual 
factors:  interest (.78), access (.67), willingness (.80), and openness (.64).  
In addition, correlations were run between the PM total score and the factors and yielded 
the following:  interest (r = .70), access (r = .75), willingness (r = .72) and openness (r = .61). 
The PM Scale is easy to read and understand making it suitable for adolescents.  This 
measure also appears to have the best content validity in terms of both published discussions of 
the construct and representation and synthesis of the multiple definitions of PM.  Because PM 
was not the main variable of investigation in the clinical trial, a self-report format was selected 
because of convenience and the ability to measure a patient characteristic that may have some 
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 bearing on treatment outcome.  For instance, patients high in PM may reap more benefit from 
treatment because this characteristic places them at an advantage in the treatment process. 
3.2.4.2 Depression   
The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1987) was used to assess improvement in 
depression (refer to Appendix B).  The BDI is a self-administered inventory designed to assess 
depression in adolescents and adults between the ages of 13 and 80.  The BDI consists of 21 
items scored on a scale from 0-5.  Adding all scores yields a total depression score, which is then 
interpreted according to a depression severity scale.  A score of 16 and above (Beck, 1987) 
designates moderate to severe depression.  The BDI is estimated to be written at the fifth-grade 
level.  The BDI has been used for both clinical and research purposes.  When used clinically, it 
measures the extent of depressive symptoms.  It is not, however, a diagnostic tool. 
Reliability and validity for the BDI have been the focus of many studies.  A study by 
Barrera and Garrison-Jones (1988) using the BDI with 65 adolescent inpatients diagnosed with 
Major Depressive Disorder found a high internal consistency reliability (r = .86).  Validity for 
this sample was assessed by correlating the BDI with the depression items on the Child 
Assessment Schedule (CAS, Hodges, McKnew, Cyrtyn, Stern & Kline, 1982) yielding a 
significant relation (r = .49, p < .001).  These authors also reported a high internal consistency 
reliability for 49 high school students with no clinical diagnosis (r = .90), and a significant 
correlation (r = .73, p < .001) with CAS depression scores.  
 Teri (1982) also assessed reliability of the BDI using a high school sample of 645 
students.  She reported a coefficient alpha for reliability of r = .87 indicating high internal 
consistency.  Teri concluded that the BDI appears to be a reliable and useful measure for high 
school students.  Clinical diagnosis was not a factor in this study. 
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 Beck (1988) conducted a meta analysis with data from 25 years of evaluation of the BDI 
across all populations.  He reported that internal consistency estimates yielded a mean coefficient 
alpha of r = .86 for psychiatric patients and r = .81 for non-psychiatric subjects.  The concurrent 
validities of the BDI with respect to clinical diagnosis and the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale 
for Depression (HRSD, Hamilton, 1960) were also reported to be high (r’s = .72 and .73, 
respectively, for psychiatric patients; r’s = .60 and .74, respectively, for non-psychiatric 
individuals). 
3.2.4.3 Level of Functioning 
The Children’s Global Assessment Scale (CGAS, Shaffer et al., 1982) was used to 
determine the degree of change in functioning over the course of treatment (refer to Appendix 
C).  The CGAS is an adaptation of the Global Assessment Scale (CGAS) developed by Endicott, 
Spitzer, and Fleiss (1976) and is designed to reflect the lowest level of functioning for a child or 
adolescent within a specified time period.  The CGAS consists of 10 categories that describe 
different levels of psychosocial functioning on a continuum of health.  As with the GAS, its 
values range from 1, representing the most functionally impaired child to 100, representing the 
healthiest.  Scores above 70 on the CGAS indicate normal functioning.  The instrument contains 
behaviorally oriented descriptions at each anchor point that depict behaviors and life situations 
applicable to children four through 16 years of age.  Specific behavioral descriptions include 
“stays at home …or in bed all day,” “school refusal, “or “inappropriate social skills” (p.129).  
For example, an individual who displayed transient symptoms (e.g., mild anxiety) but functioned 
relatively well in all areas might be rated anywhere from 81 to 90.  In contrast, an individual who 
was unable to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day) would receive a rating on the 
low end of the 21 to 30 point category. 
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 With regard to the psychometric properties of the CGAS, Shaffer et al. (1982) found the 
following.  Using written case vignettes, interrater reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient) 
was .84 denoting excellent agreement beyond chance.  Temporal stability (six-month interval) 
was .85.   
Shaffer et al. (1982) also studied the discriminant validity of the measure between 
outpatient and inpatient adolescents and found that it was able to discriminate significantly at the 
.001 level.  This indicates it is sensitive to levels of impairment between these two groups. 
Concurrent validity estimates were also generated between the Conners Abbreviated 
Parent Checklist (1969) and the CGAS utilizing outpatients. They found a modest correlation (r 
= -.25) in the predicted direction.   
In summary, adequate reliability and validity estimates have been demonstrated for this 
measure. 
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 4.0  CHAPTER 
4.1 RESULTS 
This chapter presents the main findings of the study.  First, baseline clinical measures are 
presented and compared across the three treatment groups.  Second, correlations between 
baseline demographic and clinical measures with PM total and PM factors are presented.  Then, 
an examination of protocol deviations and their relation to PM total and factor scores are 
reported.  Finally, the results of the primary and secondary hypotheses are presented.   
4.1.1 Baseline Clinical Measures of Subjects 
Subjects in the three treatment groups, CBT, SBFT and NST were similar with respect to 
age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, and family constellation (see Table 3.1, p. 69).  At 
baseline, the groups were also similar across clinical variables including level of depression, 
level of hopelessness, duration of depression, age of onset of depression, level of psychosocial 
functioning, and intelligence with no significant differences across groups (see Table 4.1).  For 
example, they were depressed on average a duration of two months, had an average age of onset 
of depression of 14.4 years and a mean IQ of 108.   Although not significantly different across 
groups, subjects in the NST group had the highest reported hopelessness score and patients in the 
SBFT had the lowest reported functioning reported on the CGAS.  
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   The entire sample composition was 76% female, 24% male, and there were 83% 
Caucasian and 17% minority participants.  The mean age was 15 years of age (range = 12.8 – 
18.0).   
Table 4-1 Baseline Clinical Measures of Subjects (N = 107) 
 
Characteristics CBT 
(N = 37) 
SBFT 
(N = 35) 
NST 
(N = 35) 
ddf* F-
value 
p 
Mean (SD) BDI 
 
Mean (SD) BHS 
 
Mean (SD)** duration of 
depression, months 
 
Mean (SD) age of onset of 
depression, years 
 
CGAS 
 
IQ 
24.3 (8.1) 
 
11.5 (5.8) 
 
2.0 (1.0) 
 
 
14.5 (1.7) 
 
 
58.8 (8.3) 
 
109.9 (11.4) 
22.6(8.1) 
 
10.3 (5.7) 
 
1.9 (.86) 
 
 
14.4 (1.5) 
 
 
54.4 (8.0) 
 
108.9 (11.9) 
25.4 (8.1) 
 
13.2 (4.9) 
 
2.0 (1.0) 
 
 
14.4 (2.3) 
 
 
56.3 (8.5) 
 
106.7 (11.0) 
104 
 
101 
 
104 
 
 
104 
 
 
104 
 
104 
1.14 
 
2.42 
 
.20 
 
 
.02 
 
 
2.49 
 
.71 
.32 
 
.09 
 
.81 
 
 
.98 
 
 
.08 
 
.49 
*ddf indicates denominator degrees of freedom, numerator degrees of freedom = 2  
**Natural log transformation prior to statistical comparison 
4.1.2 Correlation of Baseline Demographic and Clinical Measures with PM Total and 
Factors 
To examine relations between clinical variables and PM and to identify potential 
confounds to the results, baseline demographic and clinical measures were correlated with PM 
total and factor scores (see Table 5).   The four factors included 1) interest in the meaning and 
motivation of one’s behavior and that of others, 2) willingness to try and understand oneself and 
others, 3) access to feelings, and 4) openness to new ideas and capacity for change.  A decision 
was made to include factor scores in the analysis to examine specific components of PM that 
may have influenced the results.  Overall, gender, SES, duration of depression, social and 
psychiatric functioning, and verbal IQ were not associated with the total PM score.  Increased 
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 age and a later age onset of depression were associated with a higher PM total score.  A higher 
level of depression and hopelessness were associated with a lower PM total score.   
In regard to the factors, there was no association with any of the demographic or clinical 
characteristics and the interest factor.  A higher level of depression and hopelessness were 
associated with decreased access to feelings.  Therefore, less depression and hopelessness 
equated to increased access to feelings.  Five characteristics were associated with the willingness 
factor.  They included SES and a later age of onset of depression with increased willingness and 
minority race, increased depression and higher hopelessness with decreased willingness.  Finally, 
three characteristics were associated with the openness factor.  Increased age and a later age of 
onset of depression were associated with increased openness and minority race was associated 
with decreased openness.  Interpretation of these results will be discussed in the following 
chapter.   
It is important to point out that the correlation coefficients that are correlated with PM 
total on selected characteristics while statistically significant are not especially large in size.  
With the exception of one variable (willingness = -.39 on BDI) the correlation coefficients are .3 
or less indicating that any one variable is accounting for less than 10% of the variance on total 
PM.  For example, the positive correlation between PM total and age appears to be a function of 
the openness factor.  The value on openness (.26) accounts for less than 10% of the total PM 
score. Only two characteristics had PM total scores that correlated with more than one factor.  
They included BDI and BHS where PM total appears to be a function of the access and 
willingness factors.    
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 Table 4-2   Correlation of Baseline Demographic and Clinical Measures with PM Total 
and Factors (N = 101)  
 
Characteristics PM 
Total 
(N = 101) 
PM 
Interest 
(N = 98) 
PM 
Access 
(N = 97) 
PM 
Willingness 
(N = 98) 
PM 
Openness 
(N = 99) 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Race 
 
SES 
 
BDI 
 
BHS 
 
Duration of 
depression, months 
 
Age, onset of 
depression, years 
 
CGAS 
 
IQ 
.21* 
 
.05 
 
.22* 
 
-.09 
 
-.23* 
 
-.25** 
 
-.17 
 
 
.24* 
 
 
.06 
 
.18 
.09 
 
.04 
 
-.07 
 
-.01 
 
.07 
 
-.07 
 
-.09 
 
 
.10 
 
 
.10 
 
.12 
.08 
 
-.01 
 
-.01 
 
.08 
 
-.30** 
 
-.26** 
 
-.09 
 
 
.13 
 
 
.08 
 
.02 
.13 
 
.04 
 
-/24* 
 
.25* 
 
-.39** 
 
-.28** 
 
-.14 
 
 
.20* 
 
 
-.00 
 
.27 
.26** 
 
.05 
 
-.23* 
 
-.04 
 
-.15 
 
-.18 
 
-.12 
 
 
.25* 
 
 
.02 
 
.10 
 *p<.05 
**p<.01 
4.1.3 Protocol Deviations 
There was complete baseline PM data available on 101 subjects defined as having no 
more than three items left incomplete on the PM Scale.   Of the 107 subjects randomly assigned 
to treatment, four never entered the protocol, eight dropped out of treatment, seven were 
removed and placed in open treatment (median time to removal six sessions, range 1-11 
sessions), and 10 were found at various stages of the protocol to have had preexisting 
exclusionary conditions that were undetected at the time of randomization (e.g., substance abuse, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder).  Altogether protocol deviations were similar across groups (7 of 
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 37 subjects left CBT, 11 of 35 subjects left SBFT, and 11 of 35 subjects left NST) with respect to 
drop out, removal for ineligibility, or removal for clinical reasons.  Although not significant, at 
baseline a t-test revealed a lower PM total score (M = 77.7, SD = 13.1) for protocol deviators 
(mostly comprised of dropouts) compared to those who completed the study (M = 82.4, SD = 
9.9, t = 1.92, df = 99, p = .058). In the protocol deviator group, a t-test also revealed a lower 
score on willingness to try and understand oneself and others (M = 14.5, SD = 4.2) compared to 
those who completed (M = 16.2, SD =3.3), t = 1.99, df = 96, p =  .050).   
4.1.4 Data Analysis  
The data were analyzed using a general linear mixed model approach.  The mixed model 
approach (Gibbons, 1993) is applicable to longitudinal data sets that contain missing 
observations with the assumption that the data is missing at random (MAR).  MAR or ignorable 
missing is when the missing data is dependent only on observed data and not on unobserved 
(Schafer, 2002).  Use of the mixed model allows for flexibility not found in standard repeated 
measures of analyses of variance.  It uses all available data on each subject, is not affected by 
randomly missing data and can flexibly model time effects (Guerguieva & Kris, 2005).  A 
logrithmic transformation of time for BDI was imposed to linearize the data.  This allowed the 
use of generalized linear models to analyze the data.    
4.1.5 Effects of Psychological Mindedness on Treatment Outcome 
Hypothesis one predicted that the baseline PM by time interaction would be significant 
such that higher PM would result in greater improvement in depression and functioning over 
time.  A repeated measures, mixed-effect model with PM as a continuous variable, time, and 
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 baseline PM by time interactions were run.  The dependent variable was BDI or CGAS score at 
each of the visits.  Data analysis focused on the complete sample controlling for treatment group 
by including it as a fixed effect.  For this hypothesis, with a sample of 101, there was sufficient 
power of 80% to detect a significant but small effect size of at least Cohen f = .10 in the 
interaction term between PM and time at two tailed alpha of .05 (Cohen, 1988).   
There was no evidence to support the primary hypothesis, that higher PM would result in 
improved outcomes for depression and functioning over time (PM total by time interaction, BDI, 
(F (1, 96.1) = 1.59, p = .21); CGAS, (F (2, 175) = 0.11, p = .90), (see Table 6).   In addition, 
each of the factor scores was examined in relation to treatment outcome.  The factor willingness 
to try and understand oneself and others was found to have a significant interaction with time on 
BDI (F = 4.54, df = 1, 92.6, p = .036).  The parameter estimate indicates that increased 
willingness has a decreased slope in BDI, such that increased willingness resulted in worse 
outcome on BDI.   
Table 4-3 Mixed Model Results for Hypothesis 1 
Effect BDI1 CGAS 
 F Df p F Df p 
PM total as covariate 
Treatment 
Week* 
Treatment by Week 
PM tot by Week 
3.55 
1.45 
9.20 
3.45 
1.59 
1,97.8 
2,97.1 
1,96.6 
2,93.7 
1,96.1 
.0625 
.2407 
.0031 
.0357 
.2097 
1,21 
2.86 
0.71 
0.39 
0.11 
1,97 
2,97 
2,175 
4,175 
2,175 
.2750 
.0624 
.4917 
.8160 
.8972 
1Satterthwaite degrees of freedom -- BDI indicates Beck Depression Inventory 
CGAS indicates Child Global Assessment Scale -- *Week log transformed for BDI  
 
As seen in the Brent et al. (1997) paper there was an overall treatment by time 
interaction, BDI (F (2, 93.7) = 3.45, p = .036) as well as a significant decline over time in the 
self-rated depressive symptoms (F (1,96.6) = 9.20, p = .003), (see Table 4.3).  For the CGAS, 
there was not a significant overall treatment by time interaction (F (4, 175) = 0.39, p = .82) or 
significant increase in functioning over time (F (2, 175) = 0.71. p = .49) (see Table 4.3).  
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 In a fully parameterized model, a three-way interaction between PM, time and treatment 
was suggested (F = 2.88, df = 2,93.7, p = .061).  Therefore, to further explore this finding of the 
effect of PM on BDI, outcome was stratified by low PM (< 80) and high PM (> 80), (see Figure 
4.3).  In the low PM group there was not a significant treatment by time interaction, however in 
the high PM group there was a significant treatment by time interaction. Upon visual inspection 
of the curves in the low PM group what begins as a consistent decline in self-reported depressive 
symptoms for NST and SBFT gives way to an erratic pattern of spikes in depression over time 
before converging at the end of treatment.  Although there was not a significant interaction in the 
lower PM group, patients in the CBT cell demonstrated a more consistent decline in their 
depressive symptoms from beginning to end compared to patients in SBFT and NST.  
Upon inspection of the high PM group it is observed that the pattern for the three 
treatments interchanges over time.  The interaction between group treatment and time was 
statistically significant (F = 4.81, df = 2,53.7, p = .012).  CBT had more rapid improvement ( t = 
3.09, df = 53.9, p = .004) resulting in a lower BDI score at the end of treatment compared to 
SBFT, but not NST.  
The test of the primary hypothesis was further investigated by stratifying on baseline 
severity.  The mixed model was run separately for subjects with baseline severity of BDI < 21 
and for subjects BDI > 21.  PM was not found to be a significant covariate of BDI, nor was there 
a significant PM by time interaction (F=0.39, df=1,30.6, p=.54; F= 0.00, df=1,60.5, p=.99 for 
low and high severity, respectively). 
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 Because PM was found to be correlated with several clinical measures (age, race, BDI, 
BHS, age of onset) selected covariates were entered into the primary model.  Age of onset was 
not a significant covariate (F (1, 95) = 0.26, p = .61) and BHS was a significant covariate (F (1, 
95.3) = 21.57, p =  .0001).  However, controlling for these covariates did not alter the effects as 
stated above. 
In a survival analysis approach, the effect of baseline PM on outcome of time to recovery 
was examined.  Recovery was defined as having 3 or more BDI scores of <9.  The effect of 
psychological mindedness on time to recovery was examined in a Cox regression (Shoukri & 
Pause, 1999) stratified over treatment.  PM was not found to be a significant covariate in time to 
recovery (X2=0.04, df=1, p=.84).  The Cox regression was repeated on each of the factors and 
none were found to be significant covariates on time to recovery. 
4.1.6 Effect of Treatment on Psychological Mindedness 
The second hypothesis tested whether adolescents treated with cognitive-behavioral 
therapy would show a greater increase in PM as compared to systemic behavioral family therapy 
and nondirective supportive therapy.  For this hypothesis, there was sufficient power of 80% to 
detect a significant difference in change of PM between the treatment groups (n = 34 each) with 
a medium effect size of Cohen d= .68 at two tailed alpha of  .05 (Cohen, 1988). 
The change of PM over treatment was examined with a repeated measure, mixed-effect 
model at pre- and post- treatment.   The model included a treatment group by time interaction.  It 
was predicted that a significant interaction would occur indicating that PM changed over time 
differently by treatment such that subjects in CBT treatment would have greater improvement 
than subjects in SBFT or NST.  This analysis did not support the hypothesis; there was no 
significant interaction of treatment by time (F (2, 80) = 0.27, p = .77).  However, there was an 
  88
   89
improvement in PM over time across treatments (F (1, 80) = 11.20, p< .002).  Examination of 
the factors indicated that the increase in PM was also significantly seen in the factors willingness 
to try and understand oneself and others (F (1, 77) = 5.99, p =  .017) and access to feelings (F (1, 
77) = 15.39, p < .001), (see Table 4.4, Figure 4.4 & 4.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CBT NST SBFT Treatment Time Treatment x 
Time 
 Time 1 Time 
2 
Time 
1 
Time 
2 
Time 1 Time 2 F 
df 
F 
df 
F 
df 
PM Total 80.0 
(10.0) 
85.8 
(10.0) 
81.8 
(10.9) 
87.4 
(6.5) 
81.9 
(12.1) 
85.4 
(10.0) 
0.44 
2,103 
 
11.20** 
1,80 
0.27 
2,80 
PM Interest 28.6 
(5.1) 
29.7 
(4.1) 
29.1 
(4.6) 
30.5 
(2.8) 
28.6 
(4.5) 
29.1 (2.8) 0.84 
2,102 
 
2.59 
1,72 
0.20 
2,72 
PM Willingness 15.3 
(3.4) 
17.1 
(3.7) 
15.9 
(3.7) 
17.3 
(2.5) 
16.1 
(3.8) 
16.6 (3.2) 0.25 
2,102 
 
5.99* 
1,77 
0.65 
2,77 
PM Access 19.0 
(3.5) 
21.5 
(2.8) 
19.2 
(4.2) 
21.6 
(2.8) 
19.8 
(3.9) 
21.1 (3.3) 0.05 
2,102 
 
15.39*** 
1,71 
0.47 
2,71 
PM Openness 12.9 
(3.1) 
13.5 
(3.0) 
12.8 
(3.2) 
13.9 
(2.6) 
13.0 
(2.9) 
13.9 (3.0) 0.13 
2,102 
3.77 
1,77 
0.11 
2,77 
Table 4-4 Hypotheses 2 Means (SD) and Mixed Model Results 
1Between-within degrees of freedom 
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  ** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
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Figure 4-4 PM Total Overtime 
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 5.0  CHAPTER 
5.1 DICUSSION  
Hypothesis 1.  Adolescents rating higher in psychological mindedness as compared 
to adolescents rating lower in psychological mindedness will experience greater 
improvement in severity of depression as measured on the self-rated Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, 1987) and level of social and psychiatric functioning as assessed on the 
interview rated Children’s Global Assessment Scale (Shaffer et al., 1982).  Contrary to the 
hypothesis, higher PM scores were not predictive of improvement in depression or functioning 
across the whole sample.  An examination of the individual PM factors indicated that one factor, 
willingness to try and understand oneself and others, had an inverse relation with depression 
such that increased willingness resulted in worse outcome on BDI.  This finding is curious and at 
first glance appears to be counterintuitive.  However, as previously noted, higher PM has been 
related to attendance (Conte et al., 1990, 1996; McCallum & Piper, 1990) and completion of 
treatment (Tasca et al., 1999).  The inverse relation between increased willingness and worse 
outcome on the BDI might be explained by a patient’s willingness to stay in treatment even when 
they are not improving.  This would suggest that the willingness component of PM is related to 
tenacity, an aspect of PM that may promote attendance.    
The finding in the primary hypothesis that higher PM did not result in improved outcome 
is consistent with other studies that failed to find a positive relation (Conte et al., 1996; 
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 McCallum & Piper, 1990, 1997).  They are inconsistent however, with studies that found PM to 
be related to favorable outcome (Abramowitz, 1974; Conte et al., 1990; McCallum et al., 2003; 
Piper et al., 1994, 1996, 2001).  McCallum, Piper, and Conte, who have studied PM most 
extensively, have all experienced conflicting results in their study of PM and outcome.  Conte et 
al. (1996) after failing to replicate a previous finding of higher PM to improved outcome 
commented, “perhaps PM has no direct relation to outcome and is, in fact, an intervening 
variable between predictors and outcome” (p. 257). Similarly, McCallum et al. (1997) expressed 
concern about the relation of PMAP scores and treatment outcome in psychodynamic therapy 
“the failure to predict the pre-post outcome factors suggests that in addition to psychological 
mindedness and psychodynamic work there are other factors that influence patient’s response to 
treatment” (p.312).  Certainly, both statements have merit.  McCallum et al. (1997) reported 
results that indicated PM was related to a process variable “patient work” and “patient work” 
was related to better outcome, but failed to find a direct relation between PM and outcome.  In 
later work McCallum et al. (1998) and Piper et al. (2001) began to explore other characteristics 
in addition to PM such as quality of object relations (QOR) and were successful at demonstrating 
a positive relation of QOR to outcome.  These studies, as have most that have evaluated PM and 
its relation to outcome have done so in the context of psychodynamic therapies.  As a result, our 
understanding of this relation may yet be limited.  Indeed, McCallum et al. (1998) and Piper et 
al. (1997) expressed surprise when higher PM was found to be related to positive outcome in 
supportive therapy (included in the study to test the prediction that low QOR patients would 
benefit from this form of treatment).  Their prediction that high PM patients would have positive 
outcome in interpretive therapy was expected because of the assumed usefulness of PM to 
understanding and working with interpretations, but for supportive therapy it was not.  This 
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 prompted the authors to comment that high PM patients may have engaged in exploration of 
internal conflicts outside of therapy even if not encouraged to do so, or alternatively, PM may 
reflect a general ability to analyze conflicts and problem solve whether the conflicts are internal, 
as emphasized and explored in interpretive therapy or external as emphasized and explored in 
supportive therapy.   
More recently, Grant (2001) has called for exploring psychological mindedness in the 
context of other theoretical approaches.  He believes PM is best conceptualized as a form of 
metacognition, “a predisposition to engage in acts of affective and intellectual inquiry into how 
and why oneself and /or others behave, think, and feel the way that they do” (p. 12).  He sees 
CBT as being a good match for the study of PM because the self-monitoring and self-evaluation 
of one’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors is central to its success.  The present study provided 
an opportunity to test PM within the context of CBT as well as other treatment approaches.  
Although the primary hypothesis was not supported, the manner in which patients’ depression 
responded within the low and high PM groups within different treatments suggests that the 
relation is not simple and straightforward (Figure 4.3, p. 88).  In the low PM group, the 
consistent decline of depressive symptoms over time in the CBT group as compared to the up 
and down spikes of depression in the SBFT and NST groups suggests that CBT may compensate 
for a lack of PM skill.  In low PM patients CBT appears to act as a stabilizing force in regard to a 
more consistent pattern in relief of depression.  Low PM patients are thought to lack skills of 
insight, access to emotions (Conte, 1997; Hall, 1992; McCallum & Piper, 1997; Bagby, Taylor & 
Parker, 1994), and to be generally poorer candidates for psychotherapy.  Patients who lack these 
skills may substitute skills taught in CBT such as self-monitoring and evaluating cognitions, 
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 emotions and behaviors resulting in improved insight and therefore avoiding the ups and downs 
as observed in the low PM SBFT and NST groups (Figure 4.3,  p. 88).   
In contrast, patients in the high PM group  (Figure 4.3, p. 88) did not demonstrate the 
wide variability or spikes in depression in SBFT and NST that are evident in the low PM group.  
Whereas the pattern for all three treatments changed across time, overall it suggests that high PM 
patients utilize this ability to process experiences in a manner that buffers depression and is 
beneficial to one’s well being.  This would support McCallum (1998) and Piper’s (2001) 
comment that PM may be a general skill that enables individuals to reflect on internal processes 
or external events.  However, this does not preclude the possibility that specific therapies may be 
a good match for highly psychologically minded individuals.  In this study, patients in the high 
PM CBT group had a more rapid decline in relief of their depressive symptoms as compared to 
patients in the SBFT, but not NST groups.  Higher PM patients who have a natural disposition 
toward these cognitive and emotional skills may be at an advantage in utilizing CBT techniques 
resulting in relief of their depressive symptoms.   
To date, there is not a definitive answer as to whether higher PM contributes to better 
outcome.  Studies are divided in their results and overall the number of studies that has examined 
the topic is limited.  The conflicting results may be accounted for in a number of ways.  The 
operational definitions are diverse as are the instruments used to measure the construct.  The 
focus has been almost entirely on PM’s utility in regard to psychodynamic therapies, and there 
has been limited exploration in other treatment approaches.   Studies that have examined PM 
have varied in terms of duration and few articulate treatment standards, making it difficult to 
judge the quality of the treatment in which PM was tested.  In the present study, a number of 
these issues were attended to.  For example, because the evaluation of PM was done within the 
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 context of a clinical trial, a rigorous process was in place to ensure treatment integrity including 
the use of treatment manuals and ongoing evaluation by expert treatment consultants.  
Additionally, each treatment occurred over the same duration.  These steps helped ensure that the 
treatment in which PM was tested was a fair test of that treatment over the same duration of time. 
 The results suggest it would be premature to conclude that patients should be evaluated 
on the basis of their PM level as to their potential to benefit from any specific form of 
psychotherapy.  Improvement is noted across all treatments.  There is an encouraging pattern of a 
more rapid decline in depressive symptoms in both the low and high PM group suggesting CBT 
may serve a compensatory function in the absence of cognitive and emotional skills such as 
those in low PM patients and an enhancement in the presence of such skills such as those in high 
PM patients in the relief of depressive symptoms.  Further research would be necessary to 
substantiate such a possibility before any conclusions could be drawn.      
Hypothesis 2.  Patients treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy will show a greater 
increase in PM as compared to systemic behavioral family therapy and nondirective 
supportive therapy.  This hypothesis was not confirmed.  Patients in CBT did not show a 
greater increase in PM over the other two treatments.  The prediction was based on the rationale 
that because adolescents are in the midst of continuing maturation of their cognitive and 
emotional skills, PM might be more malleable to change.  Specifically it was predicted that CBT 
would have greater influence on increasing PM because skills taught in CBT are similar to those 
involved in PM.  In evaluating these results there is no basis for comparison to other studies as 
this is the first examination of the stability of PM in an exclusively adolescent population.  The 
prevailing view regarding PM is that it is a relatively stable characteristic not subject to influence 
once an individual reaches adulthood (Conte & Ratto, 1997; Dollinger, 1997; McCallum & 
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 Piper; Taylor & Taylor, 1997).  Appelbaum (1973) compared it to a musical talent when 
questioning whether an individual can be trained to become more psychologically minded.  He 
answered “probably not, to the extent that it is dependent upon constitutional or other early 
developmental structures, just as high musical proficiency cannot be taught to those without 
basic musical abilities” (p. 44). 
Although CBT had no greater influence than NST or SBFT, PM did increase over time 
across treatments.  In regard to components of PM, patients also increased in their willingness 
and ability to access feelings.  The results suggest that the act of participation in treatment may 
serve as a stimulus to increase PM.  It may be possible to teach skills that are involved in PM 
such as those in CBT, but this does not necessarily translate to an especially enhanced level of 
PM.   
The increase in PM across treatments may be due to nothing more than the adolescents’ 
continuing maturation of cognitive and emotional skills.  Unlike adults, they may have not yet 
reached their full potential for development of PM.  For many adolescents treatment is a novel 
experience and their first opportunity to exercise the type of skills involved in PM.  They sit 
down with a therapist on a weekly basis where the attention is focused on some aspect of their 
lives, either internal or external.  The experience itself may stimulate the adolescent’s cognitive 
and emotional processes in a way that promotes growth in PM as observed in Figures 4.4  and 
4.5 (p. 92-93).  There were significant increases in willingness to try and understand oneself and 
others and access to feelings.  Unfortunately, this growth of psychological mindedness did not 
translate to improved outcome.  Whether or not an increase in PM is permanent or is maintained 
only during the period treatment is occurring is unknown, but would be an interesting area for 
further study to determine if gains are upheld. 
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 5.1.1 Patient Characteristics and PM 
In evaluating the correlations between PM and patient characteristics it is noted that the 
correlation coefficients are small in size (Table 4.2, p. 83).  Gender, SES, duration of depression, 
social and psychiatric functioning, and IQ were unremarkable in regard to their influence on PM 
(Table 4.2, p. 83).  Most, but not all of the characteristics that correlate with PM total are 
congruent with what might be expected.  Of the demographic characteristics examined, older age 
was associated with higher PM and minority race associated with lower PM.  The relation of age 
and higher PM would be expected, as PM is comprised of complex cognitive and emotional 
skills that follow a developmental progression (Hatcher & Hatcher, 1997). These abilities 
increase with age, as was the case in this sample.  In contrast, the finding that minority race was 
associated with lower PM was unexpected.  On this variable, PM total was correlated with less 
willingness and openness suggesting that minority race patients PM might be affected by 
components of PM that may be related to issues of trust and risk.  It is also possible that lower 
scores on these components of PM may reflect different cultural values and meaning.  However, 
any conclusion regarding race and level of PM would be premature as the sample was comprised 
of less than 17% minority race patients.  A larger sample would be needed to explore this 
question.    
Regarding the clinical variables, increased levels of depression and increased 
hopelessness were associated with lower PM.  This finding might also be expected as depression 
and hopelessness are strongly related to cognitive processes (Beck, 1987) as is PM and it is not 
surprising that higher levels of these characteristics might negatively impact level of PM.  Both 
of these characteristics have been associated with prediction of poorer outcome in clinical studies 
(Brent, Kolko, Birmaher, Baugher, Bridge, Roth & Holder, 1998; Clark, Hops, Lewinsohn & 
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 Williams, 1992; Jayson, Wood, Kroll, Fraser & Harrington, 1998).  It may be that increased 
levels of depression and hopelessness interfere and impede the development of PM.   This 
possibility is further supported by the positive correlation between a later age of onset of 
depression and higher PM.  Being depression free for a longer period might allow an individual’s 
development of PM to reach a fuller potential.  IQ was not correlated with PM.  This would 
suggest that intelligence is not related to the ability to be psychologically minded.  It supports the 
notion that PM is a unique characteristic involving both cognitive and emotional processes. 
Regarding the factors of PM, willingness had the highest number of correlations with the 
demographic and clinical characteristics with a total of five (race, SES, BDI, BHS, age of onset).  
This was followed by openness with a total of three (age, race, age of onset).  This might suggest 
that for adolescents, PM is driven by factors related to motivation and receptivity.  Both of these 
variables relate to engagement, a key ingredient in psychotherapy.  In the past 14 years there has 
been increased emphasis on the importance of motivation to the change process.  Prochaska, 
DiClemente and Norcross (1992) introduced a stages-of-change model depicting a sequence of 
stages through which people progress as they initiate and maintain behavior change. The model 
has been applied in the field of substance abuse as researchers attempt to identify pretreatment 
variables that may positively influence treatment outcome.  The Stages of Change Readiness and 
Treatment and Eagerness Scale (SOCRATES, Miller & Tonigan, 1996) has been utilized to 
measure mental state and overt behaviors that assess motivation and has predicted positive 
treatment outcome (decreased alcohol consumption and higher motivation to abstain from 
alcohol).  Similarly, a measure of psychological mindedness in adolescents may provide a gauge 
of an individual’s motivation for change.  Issues with motivation may then be more directly 
addressed prior to treatment possibly leading to increased engagement as the process evolves.     
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 As there has been minor focus on PM in the adolescent population, the associations noted 
here between PM and personal characteristics provide a fuller picture of the potential influences 
on its development.   
5.1.2 Protocol Deviations 
A number of studies have demonstrated that higher PM individuals have increased 
attendance (Conte et al., 1990, 1996; McCallum & Piper, 1990).  Moreover, higher PM has also 
been associated with a greater probability of completing treatment (Tasca et.al., 1999).  An 
examination of patients who completed treatment in the present study indicated a lower PM total 
score for protocol deviators (M = 77.7) compared to those who completed (M = 82.4).  Although 
not significant (p = 0.58) the results were in the expected direction.  One factor, willingness, 
distinguished between protocol deviators (M =14.5) and those who completed (M = 16.2, p = 
.050). The results may indicate a higher level of motivation as reflected in the willingness factor 
as noted above and tenacity in terms of remaining with a supportive process that may be 
ultimately beneficial over time.  This would be especially useful information in working with 
adolescents who are often forced into treatment against their will.  Any interpretation of these 
results should be viewed cautiously, however, because some participants were removed from the 
clinical trial due to a later discovery of preexisting exclusionary criteria and clinical reasons that 
required they move into open treatment. 
5.1.3 Implications and Summary 
This study evaluated whether a higher level of PM at baseline would translate to better 
outcome.  It also explored whether the cognitive and emotional skills taught in CBT might 
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 enhance an individuals level of PM over other treatment approaches that do not directly teach 
these skills.  The goal was to inform whether adolescents high in PM would make better 
candidates for psychotherapy as compared to those who might benefit from a medication trial or 
a skill building approach not as reliant on the type of cognitive and emotional skills involved in 
PM.  For the first time, PM was also evaluated in the context of a completely adolescent 
population. 
The results support Hatcher & Hatcher’s (1997) contention that PM is a complex capacity 
involving cognitive and emotional skills.  As such the primary finding that higher PM was no 
better at improving outcome than lower PM cannot be accepted as unequivocal.  Rather, PM may 
interact with different treatment approaches in a unique manner as the patterns of depression in 
low and high PM patients in this study suggests.  In certain disorders such as depression, high 
PM patients may be a particularly good match for CBT when combined together may achieve a 
more rapid decline in symptoms.  Future research should test PM in relation to CBT, NST, SBFT 
and other treatments to explore whether any specific combinations of treatment and low or high 
PM has beneficial effects to outcome.   
 Future research would also profit from a more objective definition and measurement that 
is not driven by a specific theoretical orientation.  The overwhelming focus on the testing of PM 
in regard to its value in the psychodynamic therapies has slowed down our knowledge of the 
impact of PM on treatment.  The definition utilized in the present study is trans-theoretical and is 
not wedded to any particular treatment approach.  It was derived from the PM Scale and allowed 
for a reasonable evaluation of PM in alternative treatment approaches.  Grant (2001) has 
proposed a model that focuses on the metacognitive processes involved in PM, however this 
work has yet to translate to a measurement instrument.  A measure that focuses on the cognitive 
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 and emotional processes involved in PM rather than being designed to test an individual’s 
potential capacity of benefiting from a specific type of therapy would have more universal 
relevance.    
There are special challenges in the assessment of PM in children and adolescents.  For 
example, the use of only one method of assessing PM in this population may decrease validity.  
In this study, a self-report format was employed.  A number of issues are noted as possible issues 
of compromise with this type of assessment.  They include issues of compliance and anxiety 
about revealing secrets or making mistakes (Birleson, Hudson, Buchanon, & Wolff, 1987) or 
limitations in comprehension of items and reading ability (Kaminer, Feinstein & Seifer, 1995).  
Yet another difficulty noted by Birelson et al. (1987) is that although they are easier to use and 
less likely to cause fatigue, or oppositional responses, the use of forced-choice categories may 
simplify answers or distort the information obtained along particular choice sets.  Adolescents 
are at a developmental stage where self-consciousness is heightened (Santrock, 2001) resulting 
in a particular sensitivity to how they are perceived.  Including outside sources such as the 
therapist, peer, or parent in the assessment of PM will broaden the context in which the PM is 
assessed and enhance validity.   McCallum and Piper (1990) developed the PMAP, utilizing a 
videotape method that measures subject response to particular scenarios in their assessment of 
PM.  At the time of its development they noted this type of format was appealing and in step 
with current technology.  Similarly, the development of future measures of PM might involve the 
use of computers, a device that is familiar and comfortable for adolescents.    PM is generally 
considered by most researchers to be a skill.  Perhaps the cognitive and emotional skills involved 
in PM might be assessed through the development of a computer game that focuses on 
contextual issues of relevance to adolescence.  Attention might also focus on isolating behavioral 
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 manifestations of PM.  Adolescents’ beliefs may not always be reflected in their words, but more 
accurately defined in their actions.    For example, do they seek out a friend or a parent when 
distressed (openness)?  Is emotion congruent with a feeling state and apparent to others (access 
to feelings)?  Do they put into practice behaviors they desire to change (willingness)? 
A secondary analysis examined if PM can be enhanced through participation in the 
context of CBT.  There was no evidence to suggest CBT was any better than SBFT or NST at 
enhancing PM skill even when the skills are reflective of those involved in the construct.  It 
appears that individuals have a predisposition toward varying levels of PM and the emphasis on 
pretherapy assessment of the construct is reasonable as to the level of PM to which an individual 
is capable.  The gains made across all three treatments may support that the skill is stimulated by 
participation in a therapy process and for adolescents there remains a continuing maturation of 
their cognitive and emotional skills.  As there has been virtually no study of the stability of PM 
within an exclusively adolescent population it would be important to validate these results in 
additional studies.  The level of PM increased significantly across all three treatments in a 
relatively short period of time (12-16 sessions).  It may be possible that over a longer period of 
time, PM might be enhanced by involvement in a therapeutic approach such as CBT that focuses 
on skills reflective of PM or NST that focuses on feelings.  Additionally, the correlations 
between PM and the clinical variables such that greater depression and hopelessness were 
associated with lower PM scores might suggest clinical variables impede the full expression of 
PM.  It would be important to include other diagnostic groups and a non-clinical population to 
test this possibility. 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that as a patient characteristic, psychological 
mindedness does play a role in an individual’s experience in the psychotherapy process.  
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 Although neither hypothesis was supported, it appears that PM may interact with different 
treatment approaches in a unique manner.  Based on the results of this study there is no reason to 
categorize adolescents on the basis of their PM level as to their potential to benefit from 
psychotherapy.  Rather, further study of how different treatments interact with PM is needed to 
enhance our understanding of the utility of this construct in relation to the psychotherapy 
process.   
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 APPENDIX A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL MINDEDNESS SCALE 
 
Thirty-three statements are listed below.  Each statement is followed by four phrases:  Strongly 
agree; Mostly agree; Mostly disagree; Strongly disagree 
 
Please place a check ( √ ) next to the phrase which best describes how you feel about each. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. I would be willing to talk about my personal 
problems if I thought it might help me or a 
member of my family. 
 
2. I often find myself thinking about what made me 
act in a certain way. 
 
3. When you have problems, talking about them  
      with other people just makes them worse. 
 
4.   Often, even though I know that I’m having an         
emotion.  I don’t know what it is. 
 
5.  Letting off steam by talking to someone about your 
problems often makes you feel a lot better. 
 
6.  If a good friend of mine suddenly started to insult 
me, my first reaction might be to try to under-stand 
why he or she was so angry. 
 
7.  It would not be difficult for me to talk about per-
sonal problems with people such as doctors, 
teachers, guidance counselors, etc.  
 
8.  I’ve never found that talking to other people about 
my worries helps much.  
 
 
?   
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
?   
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
?   
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
?   
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
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 9.   I am curious about the reasons people behave as 
they do. 
 
10. I get annoyed when people ask me questions about 
how I’m feeling or whether something’s bothering 
me. 
 
11. Often I don’t know what I’m feeling. 
 
12. I’ve found that when I talk about my problems to 
someone else, I come up with ways to solve them 
that I hadn’t thought of before. 
 
13.  It is important to be open and honest when you 
talk about your troubles with someone you trust.  
 
14.  People sometimes say that I act as if I’m having     
a certain emotion (anger for example) when I am 
unaware of it. 
 
15. Talking about your worries to another person helps 
you to understand your problems better. 
 
16.  Usually, if I feel an emotion, I can identify it and 
name it (e.g., “I am feeling sad/happy/ nervous, 
etc.”). 
 
17.  It would be very difficult for me to discuss 
upsetting or embarrassing aspects of my personal 
life with people even if I trust them. 
 
18.  I get annoyed when people give me advice about 
changing the way I do things. 
 
19. I think that when a person has disturbing or strange 
thoughts, it is often because they are very anxious 
and upset. 
 
20. If someone gave me advice about how to do 
something better, I’d try it out. 
 
21. I get annoyed when people give me advice about 
changing the way I do things. 
 
22. There are some things in my life that I would not 
discuss with anyone. 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
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23. Fear of embarrassment of failure doesn’t stop me 
from trying something new. 
 
24. I find that once I develop a habit, it is hard to 
change, even if I know there is another way of 
doing things that might be better. 
 
25. I’m usually in touch with my feelings. 
 
26. There are certain problems which I could not 
discuss outside my immediate family. 
 
27. I frequently don’t want to delve too deeply into 
what I’m feeling. 
 
28. I like to do things the way I’ve done them in the 
past.  I don’t like to try to change my behavior 
much. 
 
29. I am willing to change old habits to try a new way 
of doing things. 
 
30. I like to try new things even if it involves taking 
risks. 
 
31. When you have troubles, talking about them to 
someone else just makes you more confused. 
 
32. I really enjoy trying to figure other people out. 
 
33. When I learn a new way of doing something, I like 
to try it out to see if it would work better than I had 
been doing before.  
 
 
? 
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 APPENDIX B 
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY 
 
Circle the answer to each question which best describes how you’ve been feeling 
recently.  If more than one applies, use the higher number. 
 
1. 0 I do not feel sad. 
 1 I feel sad. 
 2 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. 
 3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
 
2. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
 1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
 2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
 3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
 
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
 1. I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
2. As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
3. I feel as I am a complete failure as a person. 
 
4. 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
1 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don’t get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
 
5. 0 I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
6. 0 I don’t feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
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 7. 0 I don’t feel disappointed in myself. 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
 
8. 0 I don’t feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
9. 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
10. 0 I don’t cry any more than usual. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry all the time now. 
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can’t cry even though I want to. 
 
11. 0 I am no more irritated by things than I ever am. 
1 I am slightly more irritated now than usual. 
2 I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time. 
3 I feel irritated all the time now. 
 
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people 
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people 
 
13. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
3 I can’t make decisions at all any more. 
 
14. 0 I don’t feel that I look any worse than I used to. 
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
2.         I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look 
unattractive. 
3. I believe that I look ugly. 
 
15. 0 I can work about as well as before. 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I can’t do any work at all. 
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 16. 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
1 I don’t sleep as well as I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
 
17. 0 I don’t get more tired than usual. 
1 I get tired more easily than I used. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
 
18. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2 My appetite is much worse now. 
3 I have no appetite at all anymore. 
 
19. 0 I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately. 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
 
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less.  Yes ___  No ___ 
 
20. 0 I am no more worried bout my health than usual. 
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach;                
or constipation. 
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it’s hard to think of much else. 
3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything 
else. 
 
21. 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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 APPENDIX C 
CHILDREN’S GLOBAL ASSESSMENT SCALE (CGAS) 
 
100-91 Superior functioning 
90-81 Good functioning 
80-71              No more than a slight impairment in functioning 
70-61 Some difficulty in a single area, but generally functioning pretty well 
60-51              Variable functioning with sporadic difficulties 
50-41              Moderate degree of interference in functioning 
40-31              Major impairment to functioning in several areas 
30-21              Unable to function in almost all areas 
20-11              Needs considerable supervision 
10-1 Needs constant supervision 
 
100-91 Superior functioning in all areas (at home, at school and with peers); involved in a  
wide range of activities and has many interests (e.g., has hobbies or participates in  
extracurricular activities or belongs to an organized group such as Scouts, etc.);  
likeable, confident; ‘everyday’ worries never get out of hand; doing well in 
school; no symptoms. 
 
90-81 Good functioning in all areas; secure in family, school, and with peers; there may 
be transient difficulties and ‘everyday’ worries that occasionally get out of hand 
(e.g., mild anxiety associated with an important exam, occasional ‘blowups’ with 
siblings, parents or peers). 
 
80-71.1 No more than slight impairments in functioning at home, at school, or with peers;  
some disturbance of behaviour or emotional distress may be present in response to 
life stresses (e.g., parental separations, deaths, birth of a sib), but these are brief 
and interference with functioning is transient; such children are only minimally 
disturbing to others and are not considered deviant by those who know them. 
 
70-61  Some difficulty in a single area but generally functioning pretty well (e.g., 
sporadic or isolated antisocial acts, such as occasionally playing hooky or petty 
theft; consistent minor difficulties with school work; mood changes of brief 
duration; fears and anxieties which do not lead to gross avoidance behaviour; self-
doubts); has some meaningful interpersonal relationships; most people who do not 
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 know the child well would not consider him/her deviant but those who do know 
him/her well might express concern. 
 
60-51  Variable functioning with sporadic difficulties or symptoms in several but not all  
social areas; disturbance would be apparent to those who encounter the child in a 
dysfunctional setting or time but not to those who see the child in other settings. 
 
50-41  Moderate degree of interference in functioning in most social areas or severe 
impairment of functioning in one area, such as might result from, for example, 
suicidal preoccupations and ruminations, school refusal and other forms of 
anxiety, obsessive rituals, major conversion symptoms, frequent anxiety attacks, 
poor to inappropriate social skills, frequent episodes of aggressive or other 
antisocial behaviour with some preservation of meaningful social relationships. 
 
40-31 Major impairment of functioning in several areas and unable to function in one of 
these areas (i.e., disturbed at home, at school, with peers, or in society at large, 
e.g., persistent aggression without clear instigation; markedly withdrawn and 
isolated behaviour due to either mood or thought disturbance, suicidal attempts 
with clear lethal intent; such children are likely to require special schooling and/or 
hospitalization or withdrawal from school (but this is not a sufficient criterion for 
inclusion in this category).  
 
30-21 Unable to function in almost all areas e.g., stays at home, in ward, or in bed all 
day without taking part in social activities or severe impairment in reality testing 
or serious impairment in communication (e.g., sometimes incoherent or 
inappropriate). 
 
20-11 Needs considerable supervision to prevent hurting others or self (e.g., frequently 
violent, repeated suicide attempts) or to maintain personal hygiene or gross 
impairment in all forms of communication, e.g., severe abnormalities in verbal 
and gestural communication, marked social aloofness, stupor, etc. 
 
10-1 Needs constant supervision (24-hour care) due to severely aggressive or self-
destructive behaviour or gross impairment in reality testing, communication, 
cognition, affect or personal hygiene. 
 
Schaffer D., Gould, M.S., Braisic J. et al. (1983).  A children’s global assessment scale (CGAS).  
Archives of General Psychiatry, 40, 1228-1281. 
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